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INTRODUCTION
Suppose a judge finds that the defendant has or will soon
cause illegal and irreparable harm to the plaintiff unless an injunction issues. That is, the plaintiff has met the traditional
prerequisites for injunctive relief.1 The plaintiff prays for an
injunction that would prevent the harm or, if the harm has already occurred, that would restore the position that the plaintiff would have had but for the wrong--"plaintiff's rightful
position."2
May the judge do anything but issue an injunction that
completely and immediately preserves or restores the plaintiff's rightful position-no more and no less? Judges maintain
that they have equitable discretion to grant injunctive relief
that is less than complete or deny it altogether to avoid issuing
injunctions that do more harm than good.3 Such equitable discretion, however practical its purpose, takes away rights
granted to the plaintiff by the law of liability embodied in stat1. There are of course additional prerequisites-such as jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter, standing, whether a cause of action is available to this plaintiff, the court's authority to issue an injunction in this kind of
case, and the absence of defenses such as laches, estoppel, and unclean hands.
Some scholars see irreparable harm and no adequate remedy at law as two
separate requirements, while others do not. Compare, eg., Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 382, 392-93 (1983)
(two separate requirements) with D. LAYcOcK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES

335-36 (1985) (two formulations of same rule).
2. D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 15.
3. In Hill v. TVA, for example, the district court rejected the plaintiff's
argument that the court's discretion was limited to fashioning a remedy to insure compliance with the legislation at issue in the case. 419 F. Supp. 753, 763
(E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153
(1978); see also D. DOBBS, REMEDIES 54 (1973) (noting that court may deny
plaintiff equitable relief when injunction would cause economic waste).
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utes, constitutions, or common law authorities. By denying protection to a plaintiff who has successfully proven that only an
injunction will prevent illegal and irreparable harm, the judge
leaves the plaintiff short of the rightful position.
Similarly, judges maintain that they have equitable discretion to grant injunctive relief that gives the plaintiff more than
the rightful position. 4 Such use of equitable discretion enforces
the plaintiff's rights granted by the rules of liability but takes
away the defendant's right to engage in perfectly legal conduct.
As a result, the judge puts the plaintiff in a better than rightful
position and does so at the defendant's expense.
This Article asks when, if at all, judges may legitimately
exercise their equitable discretion to grant more or less than
the plaintiff's rightful position. 5 Those who conceive of judging
as policy making believe that judges should have broad discretion in formulating injunctive relief to fine tune the policy decisions reflected in the law of liability.6 In contrast, much, if not
most, of the legal profession maintains that judges should employ methods of reasoning that differ from the policy making in
which legislators and administrators engage. 7 Yet, efforts to
state how judges should make decisions have focused on decisions as to liability rather than on decisions regarding the availability and scope of injunctive relief.8 Without principles to
4. See Bailey v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78, 82-83 (1st Cir.) (allowing district
court to place in receivership and to liquidate solvent investment trust), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 834 (1947).
5. Professor David Shapiro notes that courts exercise discretion as to jurisdiction under a wide variety of doctrinal headings from forum non conveniens to abstention, topics beyond the scope of this Article. See Shapiro,
Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 548-61 (1985). That this
discretion is handled under multiple doctrinal headings and often silently
should amplify concern about the exercise of judicial power in the absence of
articulated governing principles. Shapiro offers principles that confine that
discretion regardless of the applicable jurisdictional doctrine. See id. at 579-89
(listing equitable discretion, federalism and comity, separation of powers, and
convenience of judicial administration).
6. The leading example is Professor Abram Chayes. See infra text accompanying notes 49-56.
7. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLrIcs 24-27 (2d ed. 1986) (stating judicial function
includes policy-making role different from that of legislature or executive); H.
HART & A. SAcKs, LEGAL PRocEss: BAsic PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND Ap.
PLICATION OF LAW 160-61 (tent. ed. 1958) (comparing judge's power of reasoned elaboration with president's power of continuing discretion); Dworkin,
Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1058-60 (1975) (stating that courts should
rely on principle rather than policy when deciding hard cases).
8. See, e.g., R. DwORKIN, LAW'S EMPmE (1986) (using TVA V. Hill as one
of four examples of judicial role, but focusing on decision about liability rather
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guide the exercise of equitable discretion, the judge acts as a
policy maker in framing the remedy, which throws into question the legitimacy of the judicial power to grant more or less
than the rightful position.
This Article articulates substantive principles to constrain
and legitimate the exercise of equitable discretion in fashioning
injunctive relief. In particular, the Article determines what
considerations may justify an injunction that requires the defendant to do more or less than that which achieves the plaintiff's rightful position.9 Part I shows that judges have failed to
articulate a meaningful measure of injunctive relief. In Parts II
and III, the Article examines the power to grant relief that
gives the plaintiff less than the rightful position and the power
to give the plaintiff more. In both contexts the Article critiques
existing approaches-balancing the equities and tailoring the
remedy-to the exercise of these powers and proposes and defends a new principle to guide equitable discretion. The proposed approach is normatively satisfactory because it reconciles
the need for flexibility at the remedies stage with appropriate
respect for statutes, constitutions, common law precedent, and
the role of courts. The proposed principle is also descriptively
useful because it accounts for the results in diverse and seemingly inconsistent cases. Indeed, the principle makes explicit
what is implicit in the case law. Because courts have caused
confusion by failing to make explicit how equity should honor
the law of liability, the Article concludes that courts should use
the proposed principle as the measure of injunctive relief.
than remedy). Those scholars that have rejected unconstrained policy making
in framing injunctive relief have not provided a meaningful principle by which
to constrain it. As one scholar stated: "In public law cases, the relationship of
remedy to violation is ambiguous and indirect, but it is not entirely non-existent." Schwarzchild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairnessof Negotiated InstitutionalReform, 1984 DuKE L.J. 887,
906; see also Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 602 (1983)
("My own view, reached with difficulty and held with doubt, is that at least
some form of Interest Balancing is indeed appropriate in constitutional cases.
Competing costs should not always be excluded completely from the remedial
calculus."). Professor Douglas Laycock has made the most headway toward
providing meaningful guidance for fashioning injunctive relief. See D. LAYcocK, supra note 1, at 213-321. This Article provides a principle to guide equitable discretion in formulating injunctive relief that should satisfy both those
who accept and those who reject a policy-making concept of judging.
9. This Article does not address determining the plaintiff's rightful
position.
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I. THE FAILURE OF COURTS TO DEFINE THE SCOPE
OF EQUITABLE DISCRETION
Remedies case law provides separate measures of injunctive relief for different substantive areas of law such as trespass
or school segregation.' ° Most casebooks and treatises on remedies also compartmentalize the subject." Dean Roscoe Pound
10. When courts have sought to generalize, they have done so in vague
terms. See, e.g., Dayton Bd.of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 419-20 (1977)
(tailoring remedy to fit nature and extent of constitutional violation); Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (stating that injunctive relief must be
related to condition alleged to offend Constitution, must be remedial in nature,
and must take into account interests of state and local authorities in managing
their own affairs); Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1971) (balancing individual and collective interests). They fail to bridge
the gap between aphorism and result. See generally infra text accompanying
notes 18-40.
11. Chapters in remedies casebooks and treatises often have titles such as
'Telief Against Contracts Induced by Fraud or Misrepresentation" or "Relief
against Contracts Induced by Mistake." See H. McCLINTOcK, HANDBOOK OF
THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY xiii (2d ed. 1948). McClintock's book is similar to
other quality works in the field. See, e.g., R. CHILDRES & W. JOHNSON, EQUITY,
RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES xxiii-xv (2d ed. 1974); D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at
xix-xxiii; E. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES xxxiii-xxxix (1982); R.
THOMPSON & J. SEBERT, REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND RESTITUTION xi-

xxvii (1983).
Professor Owen Fiss broke with this tradition by organizing his book on
injunctions along transsubstantive lines. See 0. FIss, INJUNCTIONS xv-xxiv
(1972). The book, now in its second edition, deals with the question raised in
this Article rather obliquely. See 0. FISS & D. RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS 7988, 107-08 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing balancing equities and remedial discretion).
Professor Laycock's remedies casebook also avoids compartmentalization.
See D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at ix-xxiv. His book addresses rightful position
in one chapter, see id. at 213-321, and balancing the equities in another, see id.
at 907-29. He does not distinguish rightful position from tailoring the remedy,
as does this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 20-23. He explicitly
recognizes a need for some exercise of equitable discretion when a court considers doing less than putting plaintiff in its rightful position but not when the
court considers doing more. See D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 245. At the
same time, however, he points to concerns that would fit within this Article's
proposed principle as a possible way of reconciling seemingly irreconcilable
cases. For example, he suggests federalism concerns as a way of reconciling
the first Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), opinion with Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See D. LAYCOCK, supra note
1, at 268-69. Because Laycock does not clearly distinguish tailoring from the
rightful position concept, he does not recognize the close relationship between
the tailoring and balancing the equities doctrines. See infra text accompanying notes 237-50.
Much of the law review writing also focuses on remedies for specific substantive areas. See, e.g., Farber, Equitable Discretion,Legal Duties, and Environmental Injunctions, 45 U. PIr. L. REv. 513 (1984) (environmental
statutes); Farrand, Ancillary Remedies in SEC Civil Enforcement Suits, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1779 (1976) (SEC injunctions); Gewirtz, supra note 8, passim
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called such compartmentalization "the decadence of equity" because the purpose of equity's flexibility gets lost in crystallized,
particularized, subject-specific rules.1 The compartmentalization of remedial law stands in stark contrast to civil procedure13 or conflicts of law, 14 each of which provides a set of
"trans-substantive"1 5 principles to guide decisions regardless of
the subject matter of the case.
This compartmentalized approach is inadequate, 16 even
when the violation falls within an established substantive compartment. Precedent only tells judges what measure of injunctive relief was appropriate in similar cases. Citing such
precedent does not, however, discharge judges' responsibility to
justify the exercise of power through explanations grounded in
broadly applicable principles. Indeed, judges do generally feel
the need to provide a principled justification for a finding of liability. They should be even more anxious to justify a decision,
for example, to deny full injunctive relief to a plaintiff who
lacks an adequate remedy at law. It is not enough to say that
according to the judge's policy sense, the infringement of the
plaintiff's legal rights is not important enough to justify the injunctive relief requested.
The compartmentalized approach to injunctions causes
even greater difficulty when the violation does not fit neatly
within an established substantive compartment because the law
of remedies lacks transsubstantive principles to guide judges in
fashioning injunctive relief. Professor Daniel Farber defends
the absence of a transsubstantive approach to injunctive relief:
"[t]he focus ... should always be on congressional intent, un(racial segregation in schools).
supra note 1.

A particularly useful exception is Shreve,

12. See Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLuM. L. REV. 20, 26-27
(1905).
13. Shreve, supra note 1, at 395-96 (describing the "methodology movement in modern procedure").
14. Interest analysis and other features of choice of law are inherently
transsubstantive. See generally, e.g., B. CURRIE, SELECrED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 584-628 (1963) (defending theory that interest analysis
should be starting point in any choice of law problem).
15. This term seems to have been coined by Robert Cover in describing
the development of the rules of procedures. See Cover, For James Wn.
Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718, 718
(1975) ("a great trans-substantive code of procedure"). The substantive law applicable in a given case may affect how these procedural rules are applied. Id.
16. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 108-11 (reviewing standards
for grant or denial of injunctive relief).
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clouded by the equity mystique."1 7 Judges cannot, however, escape the quite appropriate concern about the undisciplined use
of judicial power by focusing solely on the intent behind the
law of liability. Because legislation usually fails to define explicitly the degree of equitable discretion permissible in enforcing its rules of conduct, deducing legislative intent about
injunctive relief is not a mechanical exercise. Interpretation is
necessary, and it must rest upon understandings about the relationship between right and remedy. These understandings
must, by their very nature, be transsubstantive.
Perhaps because courts need meaningful transsubstantive
principles of injunctive relief, judges sometimes mistakenly
write as if such principles exist. For example, in Brown v.
Board of Education,8 the United States Supreme Court stated
that "the courts will be guided by equitable principles" in ending unconstitutional school segregation 9 but did not define
those principles or show how the Court's remedial approach
was consistent with the approach used in other substantive areas of law.
Two equitable doctrines might offer transsubstantive guidance on the measure of injunctive relief: balancing the equities and tailoring the remedy. Balancing the equities requires
the judge to weigh the consequences, good and bad, of issuing
an injunction to achieve the plaintiff's rightful position. 20 If
the harm of an injunction achieving that position outweighs its
benefits, the judge will deny or limit the injunction, thereby
2
achieving something less than the plaintiff's rightful position. '
Tailoring the remedy requires the judge to aim for the plaintiff's rightful position in fashioning injunctive relief.2 2 In doing
17. Farber, supra note 11, at 515.
18. 349 U.S. 294 (1955). Brown is the seminal case on remedies for unconstitutional school segregation.
19. 349 U.S. at 300. The Court went on to state that "[t]raditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies
and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs." Id.

(footnotes omitted).
20. See, e.g., Dolske v. Gormley, 58 Cal. 2d 513, 520-21, 375 P.2d 174, 179, 25
Cal. Rptr. 270, 275 (1962) (considering factors including good faith, proportionate hardships, plaintiff's delay in seeking injunction, and whether plaintiff
will suffer irreparable injury).

21. E.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 225-28, 257 N.E.2d
870, 873-74, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 317-18 (1970) (granting injunction to take effect
only if defendant failed to pay permanent damages); see infra text accompany-

ing notes 41-201.
22. See Fiss, The Supreme Court 1984 Term-Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV.L. REV. 1, 46-47 (1979) (criticizing Supreme Court's use of
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so the judge sometimes imposes conditions on the defendant
that go beyond, putting the plaintiff in a position better than
23
the rightful position.
Standing alone, however, these doctrines fail to provide a
meaningful measure of injunctive relief. Consider, for example, the famous snail darter case, TVA v. Hill.24 The Tennessee

Valley Authority (TVA), a federal agency, had built a dam that,
when used, would have violated the Endangered Species Act,
which prohibited federal agencies from injuring a critical
habitat of an endangered species.2 5 The threatened species, a
fish called the snail darter, ate snails that could live only on
gravel. 26 Once the dam's reservoir was full, sediment would
gradually cover the gravel, thereby eliminating the snail's
habitat and thus the snail darter's food source. 7 If tailoring the
injunction to the plaintiff's rightful position had been the exclusive measure of relief, the judge would have had to enjoin
the dam's use and prohibit filling the reservoir. Instead, the
lower court balanced the equities, holding that "a court of equity" should not render an expensive dam useless to save an obscure species discovered only after TVA had constructed the
dam.2 8 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the viola-

tion must cease because Congress had made species preserva29
tion the statute's paramount goal.

In TVA the Supreme Court seemed to reject the balancing
doctrine in favor of tailoring.3 0 Suppose, however, that scientists agreed that filling the reservoir would have created a new,
upstream habitat for the snail darter at the same time that it
illegally destroyed the old habitat.3 ' If achieving the statute's
tailoring principle in school desegregation cases); see also Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALrF. L. REV. 524, 536, 543-45 (1982)

(noting that court will weigh efficacy of spectrum of options in tailoring
remedy).
23. E.g., Bishop Processing Co. v. Davis, 213 Md. 465, 470-76, 132 A.2d 445,
447-50 (1957) (enjoining operation of processing plant when no less severe
method existed to prevent plant's emission of nauseating odor); see infra text
accompanying notes 202-17.
24. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
25. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 754-55 (E,D. Tenn. 1976) (citing Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 7, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th
Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
26. Id. at 755-56.
27. Id. at 756.
28. Id. at 760.
29. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978).
30. Id.
31. The judge might dispose of this situation by construing the statute to
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goals is more important than ending violations, as suggested by
some courts,32 including the Supreme Court, 33 then the judge
might well deny relief. Suppose, however, that despite the new
upstream habitat, the snails and therefore the fish were nonetheless endangered by erosion from privately owned farms. Destruction of the snail darter's habitat by private parties would
not violate the statute. If statutory goals are the measure of relief, the judge would nevertheless order TVA to protect the
snails from the farmers. If so, the snail darter would be in a
better than rightful position because it would receive broader
protection than that granted by the statute.34
These examples illustrate that the balancing and tailoring
doctrines leave a host of questions unanswered. For example,
under the tailoring doctrine, it is unclear whether the injunction must fit the rule that was violated, the rule's goals, or
some looser measure. Similarly, it is unclear why balancing
was available in some cases 35 but not in others.36 As the TVA
case demonstrated, 37 courts disagree about the applicability of
balancing even in the same case. It is not at all clear how balancing the equities differs, if at all, from second-guessing the
decisions of legislators or others who laid down the law of
liability.
Moreover, the mere existence of two separate doctrines
causes confusion. Balancing seems to sanction departures from
rightful position while tailoring pulls in the other direction.
Yet balancing the equities and tailoring deal with the same subrequire designation of the new snail bed and reversing the designation of the
old one. The statute, however, may not support such an interpretation.
32. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
33. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314-15 (1982) (stating
that enjoining violation was not sole means of ensuring compliance with statutory purpose); infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. Weinberger was recently reaffirmed in a preliminary injunction case. See Amoco Prod. Co. v.
Village of Gambell, 107 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (1987).
34. The Supreme Court has held that a violator may be ordered to do
more than what a statute requires of a nonviolator. A sharply divided
Supreme Court so held in recent cases on judicially ordered affirmative action
remedies for employment discrimination. See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text. Whether TVA should prevail is discussed at infra text accompanying notes 100-08.
35. For example, the Supreme Court used the balancing the equities approach to fashion injunctive relief in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S.
at 312.
36. See, e.g., Little Joseph Realty v. Town of Babylon, 41 N.Y.2d 738, 745,
363 N.E.2d 1163, 1168, 395 N.Y.S.2d 428, 433-34 (1977).
37. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 24-

30.
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stantive problem-the extent to which courts may respond to
concerns other than the plaintiff's rightful position.38 The different labels for these doctrines come not from their content
but from the context in which they are applied: balancing responds to pleas to do less than achieve the plaintiff's rightful
position, while tailoring responds to pleas that the court should
do more. 39 Consequently, the same principle should guide equitable discretion whether it has the balancing or the tailoring

label.

40

II.

GRANTING LESS THAN THE PLAINTIFF'S
RIGHTFUL POSITION

A.

THE BASIc DocTRINE: BALANCING THE EQuITIEs

Balancing the equities allows a judge to withhold injunctive relief altogether or to issue an injunction that stops short
of fully achieving the plaintiff's rightful position.41 Balancing
involves more than a judicial cost-benefit analysis. In deciding
whether to grant or deny the injunction, balancing requires the
38. Adopting the view that tailoring and balancing address the same substantive problem would resolve a conflict among scholars. Some scholars view
balancing the equities as a hurdle that the plaintiff must surmount before the
court tailors the remedies, see D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 52-55; Plater, supra
note 22, at 543, while another sees balancing as following the court's fashioning
of the remedy, see D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 921-22. Both perceptions are
correct views of parts of the larger picture, which encompasses three essential
stages in the development of equitable relief. First, before balancing the equities, a judge determines at least approximately the plaintiff's rightful position
because a judge who does not know the rightful position does not know what
to balance. Second, the court balances the equities to determine whether it
should aim to achieve the plaintiff's rightful position or something less. Third,
the court tailors specific, enforceable injunction terms designed to achieve the
desired position. This third stage also can require trade-offs because enforceability may well prompt injunction terms that limit the defendant's otherwise
lawful conduct. The seeming conflict among scholars arises from focusing on
fewer than all three of these stages. This partial view leads to problems in
Plater's description of equitable discretion. See infra notes 57-84 and accompanying text.
These three stages provide analytical constructs rather than descriptions
of judicial conduct. In reality, a judge might not consciously undertake the
first stage or might reconsider whether to issue an injunction at all after confronting the difficulties of tailoring a remedy to achieve the plaintiff's rightful
position.
39. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
40. See infra text accompanying notes 202-04.
41. Although authors may not mean exactly the same thing, the doctrine
also is known as "the balance of convenience," F. MAiTLAND, EQurry 327 (A.
Chaytor & W. Whittaker rev. 2d ed. 1947), or "[b]alancing [e]quities and
[h]ardships," D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 52.
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court to weigh not only the quantitative impact on the parties
and the public, 42 but also the parties' ethical positions 43 and the
fairness to all concerned. 44 For example, in Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 45 the court held that the cement company could
continue its nuisance because abatement would require closing
a $45 million plant that employed hundreds of workers while
the nuisance reduced the plaintiffs' property values by only
damages. 46 The injunction allowed the defendants, who argued
that closing down the plant would be unfair,47 to avoid abatement by paying the plaintiffs $185,000.48

B. CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO BALANCING THE EQUITIES
IN STATUTORY CASES

1.

The Policy-Making Approach

Scholars who conceive of the judicial function as policy
making see equitable discretion as an opportunity to fine tune
the policy decisions embodied in the law of liability. 49 Professor Abram Chayes, for example, argues that judges should have
broad equitable discretion to frame injunctive relief.50 He suggests that in traditional, private law cases, balancing the equities of the case involves "large discretionary elements" and that
in public law litigation-which includes statutory, constitutional, and common law cases with broad public impacts-"the
discretionary component is dramatically enhanced."5 1 Indeed,
42.

Some courts will consider the detriment but not the benefit to the

public of granting the injunction. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26
N.Y.2d 219, 225-26, 257 N.E.2d 870, 871-72, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 314-15 (1970) (stating that protecting the general public from pollution was not task for courts).
43. The court will, for example, consider the intentional nature of the defendant's violation. Similarly, it will consider the plaintiff's apparent encouragement of the defendant's conduct or delay in bringing suit, regardless of
whether such conduct rises to estoppel or laches. See D. DOBBS, supra note 3,
at 52-54.
44. See id. at 51-54.
45. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
46. Id. at 225-28, 257 N.E.2d at 873-75, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 316-19.
47. Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
48. In essence, the court forced the plaintiffs to sell an easement to pollute their homes. See id. at 228, 257 N.E.2d at 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
49. R. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 13, 108-09 (arguing that most judges and
lawyers view law as interpretive enterprise, not that they accept Dworkin's
theory of interpretation).
50. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in PublicLaw Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1292-94 (1976).
51. Chayes, Foreword. Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARV. L. REV. 4, 46 (1982); see also 0. FISs & D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 11, at
107-08. Chayes does not explicitly give common law examples of public law lit-
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Chayes characterizes the decree in public law litigation as "pro
'5 2
tanto a legislative act" and the judge as a "policy planner.
Under Chayes's position, the judge apparently enjoys the same
broad equitable discretion to fashion injunctive relief in constitutional, common law, and statutory cases.
The policy-making approach, however, fails to explain
what judges actually do in cases involving statutory violations.
Theoretically, the approach allows judges at the remedial stage
to countermand legislative priorities established in the law of
liability by ignoring the statutory rule based on their own policy choices. Yet, the TVA majority, enforcing the rule of liability, asserted that the judge could not use equitable discretion to
second-guess the legislative policy embodied in the statute.5 3
Similarly, in Little Joseph Realty v. Town of Babylon,54 when
the violator of a zoning ordinance cited Boomer as precedent
for withholding injunctive relief, the court distinguished
Boomer on the basis that liability in that case arose from common law nuisance rather than a statute or an ordinance. 55 The
court held that an injunction must issue to curb the zoning violation because otherwise the court would be usurping the legis56
lative function by rezoning the land.

Professor Zygmunt Plater who, like Chayes, views balancing the equities as policy making, 57 recoils from Chayes's broad
approach, asserting that courts lack the discretion to balance
the equities in denying injunctive relief for continuing statutory
igation, but some common law cases have the characteristics of public law
cases. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870,
309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970); infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
52. Chayes, supra note 50, at 1300 (emphasis in original). Fiss seems to
concur in the vision of the judge's role. See Fiss, supra note 22, at 29 (asserting
that courts' function is not just to resolve disputes, but to give meaning to public values); see also, e.g., J. LIEBERMAN, THE LIIGIoUs SocIET 115 (1981) (stating that simple court decree is not sufficient remedy for complexity of public
law litigation).
Justice Rehnquist embraced a Chayes-like policy-making approach, at
least in one context, in TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 213 (1978) (dissenting). He
argued that the District Court had properly exercised its equitable discretion
in denying the injunction because Congress's purpose in preserving the snail
darter "was more than outweighed" by "the significant public and social harms
that would flow from such relief and... [TVA's] demonstrated good faith." Id.
53. 437 U.S. at 194-95.
54. 41 N.Y.2d 738, 363 N.E.2d 1163, 395 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1977).
55. Id. at 744, 363 N.E.2d at 1167-68, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 433 (citing Boomer, 26
N.Y.2d at 225-26, 257 N.E.2d at 873, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17).
56. Id. at 745, 363 N.E.2d at 1168, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
57. Plater, supra note 22, at 535.
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violations. 58 Plater bases his rule on the belief that judges
should avoid intruding upon legislative choices. 5 9 Plater perhaps fears that judicial policy making in the form of balancing
the equities could undercut victories won in the legislative
60

forum.

Plater's desired ban on judicial second-guessing of legislative judgments, however, conflicts with the widespread application of traditional equitable discretion in cases involving
statutory violations. For instance, in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, the
violator of a wartime price control statute argued that an injunction was unwarranted because the violation was unintentional and he had instituted new procedures to prevent future
violations.6 1 Accepting that argument, the Supreme Court held
that the trial judge indeed had equitable discretion to refuse to
enjoin the violator and thereby deviate from the statutory
rule.

62

Attempting to distinguish Hecht, Plater argues that the
case does not mean that judges have the discretion to allow violations of the law to continue. 63 He distinguishes balancing the
equities from two other kinds of equitable discretion involved
in issuing an injunction.6 4 First, there is "threshold balancing,"
65
If
which includes various prerequisites to injunctive relief.
the prerequisites to injunctive relief exist, the court can engage
in balancing the equities to determine what conduct the court
58. Id. at 527.
59. Id. at 590-91.
60. Plater lawyered for the environmental interests in TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978). See Plater, supra note 22, at 592 n.320.
61. 321 U.S. 321, 325-26 (1944).
62. Id. at 328.
63. See Plater, supra note 22, at 546-56.
64. Id. at 536. Plater's distinctions are not altogether new. See, e.g.,
Chayes, supra note 51, at 46 (distinguishing discretion to make remedial arrangements from decree's ultimate purpose of rectifying defendant's conduct).
Fiss and Rendleman list seven kinds of discretion involved in the issuance of
injunctions. See 0. FiSs & D. RENDLEMAN supra note 11, at 107-08 (openended terms in determining liability, prerequisites to permanent relief, prerequisites to preliminary relief, choice of methods in enforcing injunction, question of when injunction will be enforced, equitable defenses, control of
sanctions for violations of injunction). Plater's categories are combinations of
some of those listed by Fiss and Rendleman. See, e.g., Plater, supra note 22, at
536-37 ("threshold balancing" combines prerequisites to permanent relief and
equitable defenses).
65. Plater, supra note 22, at 537. For example, Plater includes in threshold balancing various kinds of estoppel such as laches, unclean hands, lack of
adequate remedy at law, and irreparable harm. Id.
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will permit or forbid. 66 Second, the court has discretion in
"fashioning remedies" to determine what relief, if any, will
make the defendant conform to the conduct decided upon at
the balancing stage. 67 Plater concludes that in a statutory case
the court has discretion in threshold balancing and fashioning
remedies but that "it has no discretion or authority to balance
'68
the equities so as to permit that violation to continue.
Plater justifies this distinction by arguing that balancing
the equities involves judicial second-guessing of legislative decisions while threshold balancing and fashioning the remedy do
not.69 Threshold balancing and fashioning the remedy, however, entail discretion closely related to that which Plater
would forbid-balancing the equities-as contrary to legislative
choice. For example, the doctrines of impossibility, laches, estoppel, and unclean hands, all involved in threshold balancing
or fashioning remedies, 70 require courts to balance enforcement
of statutory rules against other priorities.7 1 Plater ultimately
66. In Plater's terms, the court decides "which conduct will be permitted
to continue and which will be subordinated." Id. at 536.
67. Id. at 536, 543. This category includes decisions to grant an injunction
and specify its terms and decisions to deny an injunction either because the
defendant will no longer violate the law or because compliance would be impossible. Id. at 543-44.
68. Id. at 527 (emphasis in original). Plater asserts that the courts have
followed his rule without adequately articulating it. Id. at 567.
69. Id. at 592. Plater points particularly to Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321 (1944), as no threat to legislative decision making because the defendant
will adhere to the legislated rules of conduct. See Plater, supra note 22, at 556.
70. See supra notes 65, 67 and accompanying text.
71. Plater implicitly acknowledges that threshold balancing involves
weighing legislative goals against other priorities. See Plater, supra note 22, at
537 n.39 (noting that plaintiff with unclean hands might prevail over defendant whose statutory violation was egregious) (citing Leo Feist v. Young, 138
F.2d 972, 973 (7th Cir. 1943)).
For an example of the prerequisites to injunctive relief involving balancing the enforcement of statutory rules against other priorities, Plater would allow discretion to forgive compliance when it is impossible, but not when it is
impracticable. Id. at 580-82. The difference between impracticability and impossibility, however, is one of degree rather than kind. The impossibility doctrine in contract law has been expanded to encompass extreme expense as
well as literal impossibility. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States,
363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1320, at 323
(1962).

The de minimis doctrine, which authorizes judges to ignore statutory violations that cause only limited damage, is another element of threshold balancing that resembles balancing the equities. The size of the damages is, however,
also a factor in balancing the equities. The de minimis doctrine might be distinguished from ordinary balancing of the hardships in that the former considers only the size of the harm to the plaintiff while the latter also considers the
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fails to differentiate between equitable discretion that does and
does not challenge legislative perogatives, and thus his attempt
to distinguish Hecht fails.
Indeed, Plater's rule is underinclusive: it prohibits balancing equities in formulating injunctive relief because balancing
allegedly intrudes upon legislative choices, yet it permits the
exercise of other forms of equitable discretion that also require
courts to balance legislative goals. Plater does, however, recognize this problem of underinclusiveness in one context. He acknowledges that postponing compliance with a statute on the
basis of cost or feasibility involves balancing similar to that involved in balancing the equities.7 2 Attempting to avoid this difficulty, he states that "courts must order immediate compliance
where it is physically and legally feasible. ' 73 Plater's broad
standard for feasibility would encompass almost every statutory
case, and consequently most injunctions would simply enforce
the statute's rule immediately.
Courts, however, use a standard of feasibility far more flexible than Plater's standard in granting time to comply. In
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo,74 the district court rejected the
Navy's contention that dropping bombs into the water for target practice was not pollution under the Clean Water Act,75
which prohibited polluting without a permit.76 On appeal the
Navy sought to continue target practice while it applied for the
statutorily required permit.77 Plater argued that the Supreme
stake of the defendant and the public. Nonetheless, the amount of harm to
the plaintiff small enough to qualify as de minirnis has no absolute size, but it
is likely in practice to be relative to the plaintiff's and defendant's overall circumstances.
De minimis damages also cannot be distinguished from balancing the equities on the basis that they are ordinarily involved in a situation in which the
plaintiff's interest is significantly smaller than the defendant's, because that is
also true for many instances in which courts balance the hardships. In Boomer,
for instance, the court balanced the equities when the plaintiffs incurred
$185,000 in permanent damages and the defendant's plant had cost more than
$45,000,000. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 225-26, 257 N.E.2d 870, 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 316-17
(1970); see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. In cases in which balancing stopped specific performance of a covenant with regard to the use of land,
the relative magnitude of the plaintiff's and the defendant's interest seemed to
count only when the disparity was grossly in the defendant's favor. See infra
notes 197-201 and accompanying text.
72. See Plater, supra note 22, at 581.
73. Id. at 582.
74. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
75. Id. at 309 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1323(a) (1982)).
76. Id. at 308 (citing § 1311(a)).
77. Id. at 310-11.
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Court should require the Navy to stop immediately, apparently
because it was physically and legally feasible to avoid violating
the law.78 The Supreme Court disagreed, allowing the Navy to
79
continue its target practice.
Plater errs in viewing Weinberger as an aberration8 ° because many other courts, even in the pollution area, also have
permitted violators to continue with their activities while tak81
ing the steps necessary to comply with the applicable statute.
78. See Plater, supra note 22, at 576-79, 592-94.
79. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320.
80. See Plater, supra note 22, at 594.
81. See, e.g., Alabama Air Pollution Control Comm'n v. Republic Steel
Corp., 646 F.2d 210, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding trial court's denial of injunction and civil penalty against violator as within sound discretion of court
because violator was making good faith efforts to reduce pollution); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 636 F.2d 1267, 1286-87 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (refusing
to invalidate regulations that the court held were invalidly adopted under statute forbidding use of PCBs after certain date unless EPA approved regulation,
and instead remanding "those portions of the record for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion," thereby allowing certain economically important
uses of PCBs to continue); Conservation Soc'y v. Secretary of Transp., 508 F.2d
927, 937-39 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that public interest justified allowing construction of highway to proceed despite NEPA violation and assumed water
pollution violation), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); 1 W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AiR AND WATER 517-19 (1986) (discussing widespread use of delayed
compliance orders under Clean Air Act).
In the famous Reserve Mining litigation, courts allowed a serious polluter
a decade to comply. See Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control
Agency, 434 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Minn. 1976); United States v. Reserve Mining
Co., 417 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1976); 417 F. Supp. 789 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 543
F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976); 412 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1976); 408 F. Supp. 1212
(D. Minn. 1976); 394 F. Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1974), modified sub nom. Reserve
Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified en banc sub nom.
Reserve Mining Co. v. Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976) (recusal order); 380 F.
Supp. 11 (D. Minn.), stayed, 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), motion to vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911, motion to vacate or modify stay denied, 419 U.S. 802 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808
(Minn. 1977); Reserve Mining Co. v. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, 294
Minn. 300, 200 N.W.2d 142 (1972). Plater would distinguish the Reserve Mining litigation on the basis that the parties and judges seemed to think of it as
more of a common law case. See Plater, supra note 22, at 571-74. As such, it
was outside the scope of Plater's rule banning judicial discretion in statutory
cases. As Plater acknowledges, however, that litigation involved violations of
three different statutes. Id. at 572-75. He dismisses two of the statutes on the
basis that they provided room for judicial discretion in defining liability or the
court's remedial role. Id. at 572. If Plater means to suggest that courts should
be denied equitable discretion only when the statute defines liability inflexibly, his rule is of much narrower import than he implies. In any event, the
third statute defined liability inflexibly under Plater's terms. It prohibited discharges into the waters without a permit. Id. at 573 (citing 13 U.S.C. § 407
(1976)). Plater dismissed that statute by pointing out that its violation came to
the fore only after the other violations were established and that its relevance
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Judges who grant time for compliance do not necessarily countermand legislative priorities because most legislation expressly
grants time to comply with new legal requirements.8 2 Furthermore, when regulators themselves violate statutory timetables
for issuing regulations, judges use a standard of reasonable feasibility to determine how quickly they must cure their violations.8 3 Courts therefore do not accept Plater's rigid standard
of feasibility for determining compliance time, and so he fails to
deal adequately with the one context in which he recognizes
the underinclusiveness of his rule.
In addition to being underinclusive in banning the exercise
of discretion that intrudes on legislative choices, Plater's rule
does not explain the case law. Plater argues, based on his
search of the case law, that his rule comports with what judges
to the remedy was simply overlooked. Id. at 573. In Plater's view, proper recognition of the Refuse Act violation would have meant an automatic injunction. See id. at 579-82.
This explanation is difficult to credit for two reasons. First, the litigation
lasted for years after the Refuse Act violation was found. See id. at 573. The
case was hotly contested and came to the attention of numerous lawyers and
judges, id. at 571 n.220, specifically on the issue of how to exercise equitable
discretion, see id. at 572. That none of them suggested that there was no discretion to exercise refutes Plater's assertion that judges invariably and instinctively refuse to allow statutory violations to continue. Second, if the court had
issued an injunction forbidding the violation, the plant would have had to close
for many years while it developed alternative ways of disposing of the waste.
The plant was the predominate employer in an area of high unemployment
and accounted for 12% of domestic iron ore production. Reserve Mining Co. v.
EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 535-37 (8th Cir. 1975), modified sub nom. Reserve Mining v.
Lord, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). The court simply would not close such a
plant so long as its threat to health was not acute and its operation seemed to
work in good faith to correct the violation.
82. E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410(a)(2)(A), 7412(c)(1)(B),
7521(a)(2) (1982). The Clean Water Act's provision outlawing the discharge of
pollutants, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), is an exception in form, but not substance.
Before enactment of the Clean Water Act in 1972, judicial interpretation of another law meant that most sources of water pollution were in violation for failure to have permits to pollute. 2 W. RODGERS, supra note 81, at 12, 167-69, 372
(1986) (citing § 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. § 407 (1982)). Obviously, the Justice Department did not move to shut
down American industry. Equally obviously, when the Clean Water Act prohibited pollution without a permit, pollution sources could not apply for and
receive permits immediately. EPA did not move against sources that lacked
permits until the mid-1970s.
83. Illinois v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1597, 1598-99 (D.D.C.
1979). In Costle Judge Gesell based the timetable for the EPA's transition to
compliance upon the agency's assessment of how it should allocate its resources among many competing tasks. Id. at 1598. As a result the agency got
years to complete tasks that the statute mandated should be completed in a
matter of months. See id.
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actually do, because he discovered no cases that used balancing
the equities to allow statutory violations to continue. 84 Courts,

however, frequently do balance the equities to allow violations
to continue, not just temporarily, but permanently.8 5 A line of
such cases has arisen under a statute that forbids filling in certain wetlands without a permit from the Corps of Engineers. 86
Although judges ordinarily cure violations by ordering the defendant to restore the wetland,87 which achieves the plaintiff's
rightful position, courts do claim the discretion to order something other than this usual remedy.8 8 Factors considered include the feasibility of restoring the original site, other ways of
achieving environmental goals, and whether the defendant vio89
lated the law knowingly.
84. Plater cites older Supreme Court cases for the proposition that "statutory declarations of public policy would limit the court's equitable discretion
with regard to substantive rules of conduct." See Plater, supra note 22, at 557
(citing United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940); Virginia Ry.
v. System Fed'n 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937)). The language of these cases, however,
emphasizes the need for remedies that do not conflict with statutory goals
rather than the rote issuance of injunctions requiring compliance with statutory rules. See, e.g., United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. at 31-32
("We cannot accept the contention that administrative rulings-such as those
here relied on--can thwart the plain purpose of a valid law."); see also Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, 300 U.S. at 552-53 ("The fact that Congress has indicated its purpose to make negotiation obligatory is in itself a declaration of
public interest and policy which should be persuasive in inducing courts to
give relief.").
85. See infra text accompanying notes 145-46.
86. See infra note 89.
87. Restoring the wetland involves removing the fill and replanting indigenous vegetation.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Context-Marks Corp., 729 F.2d 1294, 1296-97
(11th Cir. 1984) (upholding partial restoration order on equitable grounds);
United States v. Sexton Cove Estates, Inc., 526 F.2d 1293, 1301 (5th Cir. 1976)
(noting that courts should approach such cases "with a touch of equity"). Sexton Cove is the leading case stating this position. See United States v. Cumberland Farms, 647 F. Supp. 1166, 1180 (D. Mass. 1986) (stating that parties agreed
that Sexton Cove provided legal framework for determining whether restorative injunction was appropriate), aff'd, 826 F.2d 1151 (1st Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1016 (1988).
89. For example, one court allowed a public college that had filled in a
mangrove swamp to leave the wetland unrestored and ordered the college to
turn other dry land into a replacement wetland. See United States v. Board of
Trustees, 531 F. Supp. 267, 275 (S.D. Fla. 1981). The court noted that the college had not willfully violated the statute and that restoration of the original
site would disrupt the campus. Id. In another case, farmers that had put a
wild wetland into cranberry production were not required to destroy cranberry beds but only had to take action, such as maintaining water levels, to
prevent additional wetland harm. United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235,
1245 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 817 (1985). In a case arising under a state
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Another example of courts balancing the equities in cases
involving statutory violations arises under title VII's prohibition against employment discrimination. 90 In these cases judges
ordinarily grant injunctions that prohibit future violations and
require reparative relief to restore the rightful position of the
plaintiff. 91 Courts, however, claim discretion to withhold reparative relief, but only for reasons that do not defeat the broad
purposes of the Act.9 2 The employer's good faith is not considered a sufficient reason to withhold relief, but avoiding the disruption of the legitimate expectations of nonvictim employees
93
with seniority may be.
law forbidding removal and fill in state waters without a permit, the Oregon
Supreme Court answered affirmatively the question of whether "despite that
the defendant has acted contrary to the command of the legislature, the equities are such that the violation may continue if its ill effects are alleviated."
Oregon ex rel. Cox v. Davidson Indus., 291 Ore. 839, 846-47, 635 P.2d 630, 634
(1981). The court was fully aware of the distinction made by Plater, supra
note 22, at 529, between situations in which failure to grant an injunction does
not result in a continuing violation of the law, see supra text accompanying
note 58, and those in which such failure does result in continuing violations,
see, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944). See 291 Ore. at 846-47; 635
P.2d at 635.
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982). Another example involves the Federal
Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982) (FLSA). Under the
FLSA the remedy for failure to pay minimum wage or overtime is both preventive and reparative. The FLSA prohibits future violations and restores the
victims of the present violation to their rightful positions by affirmatively decreeing that the defendant shall give back pay. Id.; see Wirtz v. Milton J. Wershow Co., 416 F.2d 1071, 1073 (9th Cir. 1969) ("The court having jurisdiction of
the cause enjoys 'the historic power of equity to provide complete relief in the
light of the statutory purposes."' (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewlery, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 335 (1959))). But cf. Mitchell v. Bland, 241 F.2d 808, 810
(5th Cir. 1957) ("The nature of injunctive relief is that it is prospective, prophylactic, preventive,-not punitive."). Nonetheless, a balancing of the equities can result in underpaid employees not receiving back pay. See, e.g.,
Schultz v. Mistletoe Express Serv., 434 F.2d 1267, 1273 (10th Cir. 1970) (stating
that grant or denial of restitution depends upon equitable considerations).
91. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (noting reparative relief under title VII typically includes backpay).
92. Id. (dictum).
93. Id. at 422 ("[U]nder Title VII, the mere absence of bad faith simply
opens the door to equity; it does not depress the scales in the employer's
favor."); see also Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 721-23 (1978) (holding that gender discrimination in pension contributions
should be remedied only prospectively because of nonvictim employees' legitimate expectations); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 376 (1977) (asserting that "equitable balance ... should be struck between
statutory rights of victims and the contractual rights of non-victim employees").
In Manhart, the reparative injunction involved monetary compensation.
435 U.S. at 721-23. Whether the relief is called an injunction or damages
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Although the wetland and title VII cases differ from TVA 94
and Weinberger95 because they involved repairing past violations rather than preventing future ones, 96 the rightful position
concept calls for courts to issue injunctions for both purposes.
Reparative injunctions differ from preventive injunctions in
that undoing a statutory violation is generally more difficult
than avoiding it in the first place, a factor that the legislature
probably did not consider when it formulated and enacted the
law of liability. Preventive injunctions, however, also can present such factors, as when it is more difficult for a defendant to
end an ongoing violation than it would have been to avoid the
violation in the first place and the legislature anticipated that
the statute would have a prospective impact only. Courts have
declined to issue preventive injunctions in such cases, thereby
allowing the violation to continue at least for awhile. 97 The
should not change the result. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (retroactive award of monetary relief, which was directed on its face against state
official individually, would be paid by state and therefore was indistinguishable from award of damages against state).
94. 437 U.S. 153 (1978); see supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
95. 456 U.S. 305 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 74-79.
96. Professor Laycock questions whether an ironclad distinction exists between preventive and reparative injunctions, but he finds the terms useful for
descriptive purposes. Laycock, Injunctions and the IrreparableInjury Rule
(Book Review), 57 TEx. L. REV. 1065, 1073-75 (1979).
97. For example, in Louisiana v. Lee ex rel. Guste, 635 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D.
La. 1986), a court declined to enjoin a large dredging operation, although the
federal permit required to dredge was issued in violation of the NEPA. Id. at
1129 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982)). The court ordered the federal
agency to reevaluate the permit in light of the Act but allowed the privately
run dredging to continue in the meantime. Id. Although the dredging clearly
violated the Act, the court concluded that halting it in the interim would probably work economic disaster on the dredgers. Id. at 1128. Plater considers
claims that courts have balanced the equities in the NEPA cases, Plater, supra
note 22, at 574-75, and dismisses them on the basis that they were preliminary
injunction cases or cases in which "procedural compliance had already substantially occurred." Id. at 575. In Lee, which was decided after Plater wrote,
however, the court issued a permanent injunction. Id. at 1129. In the course
of a detailed analysis of the scope of its equitable discretion to allow a violation
to continue, the court clearly showed it was aware of the difference between
NEPA cases involving preliminary injunctions and those involving permanent
injunctions. See id. at 1124-25.
The Lee court relied upon Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, which
held that the decision to grant or deny a permanent injunction, when a NEPA
violation continues, requires the judge to consider the objectives of the Act in
light of the larger public interest. See Lee, 635 F. Supp. at 1129 (citing Marsh,
651 F.2d 983, 1005-06 (5th Cir. 1981)). Because the defendant's violation in
Marsh was blatant, the court reversed the lower court's denial of the injunction but authorized that court to allow aspects of the project to go forward
should the defendants demonstrate that the public interest would suffer irrep-
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presence of factors not comprehended in the legislative calculus
may provide a persuasive basis for a rule that generally bans
balancing in fashioning injunctive relief in statutory cases but
98
allows balancing in cases involving such factors. Plater's rule,
however, makes no such distinction. In any case, the stated rationale for Plater's rule-avoiding judicial intrusion into legislative choices-does not justify a complete ban on balancing the
equities in statutory cases.
2.

A More Compliant Approach

Professor Chayes's elastic approach permitting broad discretion to balance equities in all cases, especially those with
broad public policy impacts, and Professor Plater's rigid approach allowing no discretion to balance in statutory cases both
fail to explain what judges actually do. Rather, judges promise
plaintiffs that a judge's policy opinions will not trump legislative policy, and they promise defendants that a statute will not
be enforced rigidly in contravention of its spirit. The analysis
of Plater's rule suggested that flexibility in structuring injunctive relief in statutory cases is compatible with respect for legislative choice. The following principle codifies the results of this

analysis:
The injunction should impose terms to achieve the plaintiff's rightful
position unless (a) different relief is consistent with the goals of the
statute and (b) the case involves a factor justifying departure from
the statutory rule that was not reflected in its formulation, but the injunction may never aim to achieve more than the plaintiff's rightful
position.

Unlike Chayes's and Plater's approaches, this proposed
principle successfully explains when judges framing injunctive
relief in statutory cases will or will not deviate from the statuarable harm. Marsh, 651 F.2d at 1006-07. In light of the defendant's bad faith,
saving construction costs would not constitute a sufficient demonstration, but
something like flood prevention might.
Plater distinguishes two NEPA cases that allowed violations to continue,
see State of Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978), vacated in part
sub nori. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978), and Realty
Income Trust v. Eckerd, 564 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1977), on the basis that enjoining the federal actions challenged in those cases was unnecessary to serve
the purpose of the NEPA. Plater, supra note 22, at 575 n.240-41. This is quite
a step away from his position that the court must prevent violations of a rule,

rather than look behind the rule to see whether upholding the rule is consistent with legislative priorities. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Alexander,
480 F. Supp. 980, 1003 (D.D.C. 1979) (following Realty Income Trust, 564 F.2d

at 438).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 57-69.
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tory rule. The Supreme Court has stated that a judge formulating injunctive relief must honor the the legislature's goals
rather than a personal conception of the public interest.9 9 Indeed, the language of the TVA opinion suggests the Court rejected the TVA's proposed remedy, which jeopardized the snail
darter's survival, because the Endangered Species Act had
made species preservation its paramount goal. 100 Under the
proposed principle, the facts of TVA 10 similarly would not justify deviation from the statutory rule because such variance
would not have been consistent with the Act's goals and thus
the first prong of the proposed principle would not have been
satisfied.
Courts, however, should not read TVA as adopting Plater's
102
rule that judges must always enforce statutory rules strictly.
When a statute's goals will be fulfilled without enforcement of
the statutory rule, the Weinberger opinion indicates that a
judge can excuse compliance with the rule. Unlike the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act'0 3 at issue in Wein99. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416 (1975)
("[S]uch discretionary choices are not left to a court's 'inclination, but to its
judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles."' (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 35 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d))); see
also Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 331 (1944) (Court must exercise power
bestowed by Congress "in light of the large objectives of the Act").
The Court's reason for concluding that a violation will not undercut the
statute's goals must be capable of general application without frustrating those
goals. As the Supreme Court stated in Albemarle Paper,"given a finding of
unlawful discrimination, backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if
applied generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for
injuries suffered through past discrimination." 422 U.S. at 421.
100. See 437 U.S. 153 (1978). "Once Congress... has decided the order of
priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for
the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.... Congress has spoken in the plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has
been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities
...

." Id. at 194.

101. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
102. Although one can read TVA as suggesting that courts must always enforce statutory rules strictly, this interpretation would mean that Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), silently overruled TWA. Alternatively,
the TVA Court might have meant that it must enforce the Endangered Species
Act strictly because Congress intended that this particular act should be
strictly enforced. The Court has long said that Congress can mandate the provision of a particular remedy. See, e.g., Hecht Co., 321 U.S. at 330. This interpretation of TVA limits the case's significance and also fails to explain why the
statutory language in TVA should be read as mandatory while that in Hecht
should not be.
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
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berger did not make environmental values paramount. The Act
specifically contemplated allowing pollution based upon a balancing of environmental and other goals.1°4 The Navy's activities were not, according to the evidence, damaging water
quality. 05 Consequently, although the Navy had violated the
statute's rule not to pollute without a permit, the court could
have found that allowing the Navy to continue polluting while
it applied for a permit did not contravene legislative goals.
Thus, the Court's decision not to require the Navy to achieve
the plaintiff's rightful position satisfied the first prong of the
proposed principle, which requires that deviations from the
plaintiff's rightful position comport with statutory goals.
To justify relief that does less than immediately and fully
return the plaintiff to the rightful position, however, the second
prong of the proposed principle requires the defendant to show
more than consistency with the statute's goals. The goal of the
Endangered Species Act, the statute involved in TVA, is to preserve threatened species, 10 6 and its rule is that federal agencies
may not damage critical habitats of those species. 10 7 If a federal
agency that wanted to destroy a critical habitat of an endangered species offered to preserve the species in a specially constructed new habitat, a court nevertheless should not allow
violation of the statutory rule solely on the basis that the statutory goal would be achieved because Congress expressly chose
the means-preserving critical habitats-to achieve its goal of
species preservation.1 0 8 Allowing the agency to destroy the
habitat would countermand a specific legislative choice. To justify deviation from the statutory rule, therefore, a defendant
must demonstrate that the case presents a factor that the legislature did not already take into account when the rule was
formulated.
For example, in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, the wartime price control statute required retailers to base current prices on prices
104. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 316-18.
105. The Supreme Court noted in its opinion that the district court found
that the Navy's discharges of pollutants into the sea had not harmed water
quality. Id. at 307.
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982) (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976)).
107. Id. § 1536.
108. Courts acknowledge that agencies, like courts, have equitable discretion in individual cases. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323,
358-59 (D.C. Cir. 1979). An agency's power to exempt entire categories of cases
from a statutory rule, however, is limited and cannot be justified simply on the
basis that such power would be a desirable way to achieve statutory goals. Id.
After all, Congress specified how the goals should be achieved.
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charged during a pre-inflationary base period. 10 9 Even if the retailer could show that violating the rule with respect to a specific good would not undercut the statutory goal of controlling
inflation, a court could not permit such a violation because Congress decided to apply the rule to all goods regardless of
whether application to a specific good was necessary to achieve
the statutory goal.1 10 Assume, however, that a fire in the Hecht
Company's bookkeeping department made it impossible without great expense to determine what prices the company had
charged during the base price period. This hardship is a factor
that Congress probably did not consider.1 1 - Under these facts,
the court could have appropriately excused the company from
basing its prices on those it charged during the price period if
the statute's anti-inflation goals were protected by, for example, requiring the Hecht Company to charge the same prices as
charged by a comparable store in another city.
Perhaps the factor that would most frequently permit departure from the statutory rule is hardship caused by a good
faith error as to one's duties.1 12 In deciding what conduct to
forbid, legislatures typically contemplate that persons will be
aware of the law's applicability. As a result, in cases in which
the plaintiff seeks a reparative injunction, courts sometimes do
not require full repair of past violations if the defendant justifiably believed he was acting in accordance with the law. n 3 In
contrast, in cases involving preventive rather than reparative
injunctions, courts normally do not allow the defendant to rely
on an erroneous view of the law as an excuse to engage in a
new violation but may allow it as an excuse for a preexisting
violation. 114 In cases involving a preexisting violation, courts
109. 321 U.S. 321, 322 n.1 (1944).
110.

Another way to reach a similar result is to say that fairness among

sellers and buyers was an additional goal and that this goal would be served by
making the price rule applicable to all transactions.
111. See also supra notes 64-98 and accompanying text (citing other examples of factors that a legislature would not have considered).
112. Even a violator that is clearly in good faith, however, cannot always
escape reparative relief. For instance, good faith alone does not excuse violators of the minimum wage requirements of the Federal Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1982), from handing over back pay because that would
contravene the Act's income distribution goals. See supra note 90. In Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), however, the statutory goals
were far more flexible. See supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
113. See, e.g., pollution control cases discussed supra note 81.
114. See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320 (allowing defendant to continue violation pending permit compliance in case involving preventive injunction).
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typically grant time to comply to account for the defendant's
reliance on the ongoing violation, but only if doing so appears
consistent with the statute's goals. 115 Because legislatures formulate rules expecting that defendants will know that the law
applies, defendants are more likely to face hardships that the
legislature did not anticipate when the plaintiff seeks reparation for the defendant's past violation or cessation of ongoing
violation rather than an order preventing the defendant from
engaging in a new violation. Courts should not permit a defendant to argue reliance if the statutory violation was in bad
faith-that is, with knowledge. Otherwise, the defendant
would be allowed, in essence, to amend the legislation's effective date. Courts should, however, treat a defendant as acting
in good faith when the defendant has a colorable but ultimately

unsuccessful claim. 116
Consistent with the idea that a good faith defendant's reliance is likely a factor that the legislature did not consider, the
Court's decision in favor of the Navy in Weinberger"17 can be
defended under the proposed principle when characterized as
sanctioning an ongoing violation. The statute at issue in Weinberger"1 8 did not lay down a rule of conduct but rather established a rule of procedure through which an agency would
delineate permissible conduct. 119 Thus, in Weinberger the
115. Id. at 318 (noting that courts usually require detailed schedule of
compliance).
116. See infra note 184. A recent example arose under legislation that set
a deadline by which the operator of certain television stations had to sell them
or the newspapers that he owned. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1988, at B3, col. 5-6
(describing unreported 1988 opinion by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia). In the context of the owner's challenge to the legislation's
constitutionality, the court held that the owner could violate statutory provisions until 45 days after a decision on the merits of the legal action. Id. at col.
5. Otherwise, the owner would have had to choose between abandoning his
claim or selling his assets overnight, a hardship that the legislation did not
contemplate.
117. 456 U.S. at 320; see supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
118. 456 U.S. at 308-09 (citing Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1133(a),
1323(d) (1982)).
119. The plaintiffs in Weinberger argued that the procedures of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982), for permitting pollution were exclusive and left no room for the exercise of equitable discretion. 456 U.S. at 318.
At that juncture, however, the plaintiffs were making a narrow argument of
statutory interpretation that conflicted with a long-standing judicial practice to
interpret statutes so as not to eliminate such discretion unless Congress has
made a clear statement to the contrary. See Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,
330 (1944) (invoking this judicial practice). In contrast, the plaintiffs in TVA v.
Hill relied upon the paramount congressional goal of species preservation. 437
U.S. 153, 174-87 (1978).

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:627

Navy was not engaged in conduct that Congress had expressly
prohibited and could conform to the legislative plan by simply
repairing its previous failure to procure a permit. 20 Indeed,
Congress clearly intended polluters to have an opportunity to
apply for a permit before being shut down. 12 1 Weinberger
therefore did not allow conduct that Congress had decided was
contrary to the public interest. Rather, it allowed only the temporary violation of a procedural requirement. Consequently,
the majority's decision to balance the equities in favor of a presumptively good faith defendant did not countermand a legislative choice.

C.

DOES THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLE HELP DECIDE CASES?

Although the proposed principle seems to explain what
judges actually do, it will fail to provide future assistance in deciding cases unless the judge can ascertain the statute's goals
and the factors that the legislature took into account. Fortunately, in interpreting statutes for the purpose of determining
liability, courts rely on these same concepts. Courts regard the
goals of a statute, otherwise known as legislative purpose, 22
and the statute's context as central in statutory interpretation. 2 3 Courts use the statute's rules, structure, and goals together with the various conversations revealed in the statute's
legislative history to construct the legislature's goals and the
factors that it considered. 2 4 Courts can use the same process in
providing equitable relief to deduce the factors that the legisla120. See 456 U.S. at 320.
121. See id.
122. As Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks put it, "[tJhemeaning of a
statute is never plain unless it fits with some intelligible purpose." H. HART

& A. SACKS, supra note 7, at 1157 (emphasis in original).
123. A statute's context includes its context not just in the cultural sense,
but also "in the narrower sense of [the] surrounding coordinate fund of relevant assumptions [or factors] that the language vehicle takes into account." R.
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 108 (1975).

124. The legislature, as a collective body, does not have mental states, and
thus the concepts of its purposes and assumptions are fictions. The legislative
history may contain speeches or writings pertinent to goals and assumptions,
but typically through the voice of only some of the participants who may tell
only some or conflicting parts of the story. Professor Ronald Dworkin distinguishes between "conversational" and "constructive" approaches to interpretation, with the former based exclusively upon the creators' statements about
what the text involves and the latter based upon the interpreters' own reading
of the text and surrounding information. R. DWORKIN, supra note 8, at 49-55.
Dworkin argues that the constructive approach is appropriate to law. Id. at 54.
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ture took into account. 125
After determining the relevant factors and goals, if the
case presents a factor outside the legislative calculus and the
legislature's goals do not require an injunction ordering immediate compliance, the judge must still decide how much flexibility is consistent with the legislative goals. For instance, when
the cost to the defendant of complying with the statute is a
function of the time allowed to do so, the judge will have to
evaluate the relative priority that the legislature placed upon
its regulatory objectives versus the costs of achieving them.
This decision regarding the appropriate flexibility in fashioning
equitable relief involves a limited exercise of discretion.
Although the principle proposed to guide balancing the equities is not mechanical, it is not judicial policy making in disguise. 2 6 In deciding how much flexibility in fashioning
injunctive relief is consistent with legislative goals, a judge does
not have unbounded discretion because interpretation of the
statute provides standards to guide the exercise of that discretion. In contrast, the policy-making approach denies that the
125. Consider, for example, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), in
which Congress provided that government documents should be made available to the public, except for enumerated exceptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)-(b)
(1982). If a document is not within one of these exceptions and is withheld,
the agency is liable. Id. § 552(c). After a finding of liability, courts generally
may not deny an injunction requiring the agency to turn the document over
because doing so would cause harm. See generally Long v. IRS, 693 F.2d 907,
910 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that injunction was necessary to prevent prolonged
delays and repeated litigation); Tennessean Newspapers v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657,
661 (6th Cir. 1972) (stating that Congress intended to require disclosure under
FOIA absent an exemption); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1077 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (finding that Congress did not intend to confer on courts general power
to deny relief on grounds apart from FOIA's exemptions); Genetal'Servs. Adnin. v. Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 1969) (stating that effect on public is
primary consideration in weighing effects of disclosure and nondisclosure).
Courts have interpreted the enumerated exceptions to mean that Congress has
weighed the pros and cons of document disclosure with some care to investigate competing factors. See, e.g., 448 F.2d at 1077 (stating that FOIA strikes
balance among competing concerns through disclosure requirement and specific exemptions). Courts nonetheless say that exceptional cases may arise in
which an injunction may be denied. See, e.g., Tennessean Newspapers, 464 F.2d
at 661 (implying that claim of executive privilege may be sufficient grounds for
denying injunction). Although no such case appears to have arisen, courts
have left the door open to a showing that a particular case presents a factor
that was not within the congressional calculus.
126. The proposed principle grants the judge what Dworkin has called discretion "in a weak sense" rather than in "a stronger sense." Dworkin, The
Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 14, 32-34 (1967). For Dworkin an official
has discretion in the strong sense when "on some issue he is simply not bound
by standards set by the authority in question." Id. at 33.
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judge is bound by such standards, or at least it fails to say how
the judge's discretion is limited.127 Thus, the proposed principle
would assist judges by identifying both the important issues and
the relevant arguments. As the case law now stands, judges
must grope to understand what determines the availability and
scope of an injunction unless there is precedent right on point.
The proposed principle provides judges transsubstantive guidance for fashioning injunctive relief.
D.

WHICH APPROACH BEST FITS THE

JUDICIAL ROLE?

The judge's role should affect the measure of injunctive relief in at least three ways. First, the measure must simultaneously meet the judge's need for both flexibility to adapt the law
to varying conditions and for constraint to justify the exercise
of judicial power. Second, the measure must be consistent with
principles of statutory interpretation. Third, regardless of a
legislature's desire to confer broad discretion on courts, the
measure must not be so flexible as to amount to an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.
1. The Judge's Need for Flexibility and Justification
In determining liability, the judge decides only whether the
elements of the violation are present, whereas in balancing the
equities when fashioning a remedy, the judge also considers
whether there are factors that make it unfair to order the defendant to stop the violation immediately. 2 8 For instance, if
the defendant builds a structure that violates the setback requirements of the local zoning ordinance, that is the beginning
and end of the question of liability. 12 9 If the plaintiff wants the

127. Dworkin wrote of discretion in another weak sense-when the official
is subject to review. Id at 32. A trial judge's decision applying the policymaking approach can be appealed, but that approach still falls short of providing standards to control the discretion of the appellate court. That does not
mean, however, that the policy-making approach necessarily allows judges to
decide on whim because discretion in the weak sense does not mean that an
official is "free to decide without recourse to standards of sense and fairness,
but only that his decision is not controlled by a standard furnished by the particular authority we have in mind when we raise the question of discretion."
Id- at 34.
128. The law of liability is, however, still relevant at the remedy stage. In
assessing the hardship to the plaintiff of denying an injunction, the court must
use the plaintiff's rightful position under the law of liability as a bench mark.
Similarly, in determining whether the irreparable injury prerequisite for an
injunction is met, the court must use the same bench mark in assessing the
substantiality of plaintiff's injury.
129. Aside, of course, from questions such as jurisdiction.
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violation enjoined, however, the judge will want to know
whether the defendant encroached intentionally or recklessly,
the cost to defendant of removing the encroachment, whether
removing the encroachment will harm innocent third parties,
the importance to the plaintiff of having the encroachment removed, and so on. Courts make this broader inquiry at the remedial stage primarily because granting an injunction rather
than damages presents a greater threat of gross inefficiency. 130
Consequently, equity introduces flexibility into the cold enforcement of law to address the inefficiencies associated with
injunctive relief. This flexibility is justified because the judicial
process in cases that seek remedies at law has sources of flexibility not available in cases that seek equitable relief. In suits
for damages, much of what goes into balancing the equities in
injunction cases gets reflected in jury nullification, the determi131
nation of the amount of compensatory or punitive damages,
limits on garnishment and execution designed to avoid severe
hardship, and sometimes a kind of balancing of the equities in
the damage context itself. 32 Moreover, criminal actions involve flexibility in prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification,
and sentencing judgment. Thus, a suit for an injunction without balancing the equities would present a rare instance of the
judicial process without a safety valve.
130. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. Rzv. 1089, 1115-24 (1972)
(illustrating problems encountered in implementing economically efficient
remedy in context of pollution control rules). For instance, if the remedy
were damages only, the defendant could choose the cheaper of the alternatives
of paying the plaintiff or removing the encroachment. If an injunction issues,
the choice shifts to the plaintiff who can then make the defendant spend large
sums to remove even a minor encroachment or pay a sum disproportionate to
the damage done. Alternatively, the defendant could pay the plaintiff to relent so that, arguably, the difference between injunctive and damage relief
would go more to distribution than to efficiency. See id. at 1118. If plaintiffs
are numerous, however, striking such a deal may be impossible. Even if the
plaintiffs are not numerous, a stubborn set of plaintiffs can refuse to accept a
payment that a judge would consider more than reasonable. Id. at 1119.
In addition to threatening gross inefficiency, the injunction also curbs the
defendant's liberty more than money damages, but denying an injunction impinges upon the plaintiff's liberty as well.
131. Cf. 0. Fiss, THE CrVIL RIGHTs INJUNCrION 101 n.34 (1978) (citing concurrence by Justice Rehnquist in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
441 (1975), for its comparison between discretion in issuing injunction and
workings of jury).
132. See, e.g., Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 11314 (Okla. 1962) (holding that measure of damages when contract has not been
performed was diminution in value because of nonperformance rather than
cost of performance of entire contract), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963).
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Although Plater claims that judges should not balance the
equities in statutory cases and should apply statutory rules
strictly, 33 the reasons for balancing in nonstatutory cases apply
fully to statutory cases. In nonstatutory cases, courts balance
the equities because injunctive enforcement of a rule of liability
that is fair and efficient in general may be unfair or inefficient
in a particular context. In formulating statutory rules, legislatures can rarely confine statutory definitions of violations to instances in which enjoining them would invariably be fair and
efficient. Judges need the kind of flexibility that they have in
nonstatutory cases to act as a safety valve to prevent unfair and
inefficient application of a statutory rule. Plater argues that
legislative relief, not balancing the equities, provides the appropriate safety valve in statutory cases.'3 That safety valve, however, is available only in extraordinary cases that get priority
on the legislative agenda, such as TVA v. Hill,13 5 not in garden

variety cases. The proposed principle provides a safety valve
for all statutory cases by giving judges the flexibility necessary,
but in a way that restrains judges' discretion, forcing
them to
36
1
honor the choices that the legislature did make.

Moreover, both Plater's and Chayes's approaches would
put the judge in a difficult personal position. The judge in
street clothes is in principle an equal of the parties. What justifies the power of the judge in robes is that the judge speaks the
133. See supra text accompanying notes 57-73.
134. See Plater, supra note 22, at 583-88; see also Farber, supra note 11, at
543.
135. See 437 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1978). TVA had a far better chance than most
defendants to get legislative attention because TVA is a large and cohesive organization; TVA is a public authority whose operation impacts upon the public
in many states in which TVA works closely with the congressional delegations;
the public, not the shareholders, would bear any loss of the large investment
sunk in the dam; the snail darter had no public appeal other than as a symbol;
and the case had become an example across the nation of excessive environmental regulation, see id. at 159.
136. Professor Daniel Farber has argued that balancing the equities is inappropriate for some categories of statutes, such as environmental statutes, because Congress has already balanced the competing interests. See Farber,
supra note 11, at 543-44. Even in that area, however, Congress will have balanced some but not necessarily all the factors that may arise. For instance,
under the Clean Water Act, the EPA must account for the feasibility of compliance in setting effluent standards, 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1982), but a polluter
may not have to comply with these standards if it can demonstrate that it confronts a problem in compliance that the EPA did not consider. See E.I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977) (finding that statute
authorizing creation of guidelines must allow for variations in individual
plants).
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law. Regarding findings of liability, judges can readily respond
to a defendant's rebuke "how dare you find me liable," with
"the law made you liable."' 3 7 This answer is inadequate, however, when the defendant challenges the judge's authority to issue an injunction because the judge must exercise discretion in
shaping the injunction to fit the case. 138 Relative to the finding
of liability, the injunction therefore looks more like personal
opinion than impersonal law.13 9 By requiring the judge to end
the statutory violation regardless of the consequences, Plater's
approach would subject the judge to personal criticism by taking away the judge's flexibility to mitigate the consequences.
Similarly, by turning the judge into a policy maker, Chayes's
approach fails to offer constraints to both legitimate the exercise of equitable discretion and allow the judge to cast at least
some of the blame for the injunction's consequences onto the

law.'
2.

40

Consistency with Principles of Statutory Construction

The Supreme Court maintains that Congress can provide in
a statute's text that courts must enforce the statute's rule
137. Most cases, viewed in the context of precedent, are clear, although
scholastic preoccupation with unclear cases tends to obscure this point. As to
the more difficult cases, judges claim to tackle them as matters of interpretation rather than personal opinion. See R. DwORuIN, supra note 8, at 88. Professor Dworkin has argued that accepting this claim is not unsophisticated. Id.
138. Even if the judge decides that the violation-must end, the injunction
will have to state the terms on which this will happen. For example, if the
judge in United States v. Board of Trustees, 531 F. Supp. 267 (S.D. Fla. 1981),
had ordered the college to restore the filled wetland, see supra note 89, the
order would have had to indicate what would have constituted adequate restoration and the date by which the college buildings would have had to be torn
down and the restoration work finished. See 531 F. Supp. at 274-75 (stating
that court has authority to require complete restoration of the land).
139. Indeed, as Professor Fiss wrote, the injunction's
issuance or enforcement... becomes an expression of a person, as
much as it is an expression of an office, and represents a striking instance of the personification of the law-when we speak of the decisional authority in the injunctive process we often talk not of the law
or even of the court, but of Judge Johnson or Judge Garrity.
0. FISS, supra note 131, at 28 (emphasis in original).
140. The proposed principle does create problems of its own for judges by
requiring them to make difficult decisions, but these administrative costs are
justified by the more efficient pursuit of goals of the law of liability through
balancing the equities. Moreover, Plater's approach to statutory cases, see
supra text accompanying notes 57-73, would in many cases multiply the difficult decisions because its harshness would provoke many defendants to use
every opportunity to test the court's and plaintiff's resolve.
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strictly, without balancing the equities. 14 1 Because regulatory
statutes usually do not contain such express provisions, the debate centers on what meaning to give Congress's silence.
Plater's approach and the proposed principle are essentially
competing rules of statutory construction, one reading the silence against balancing in statutory cases and the other in its
favor. In Hecht, however, the Court said that absent an express
statement to the contrary, judges should use the same equitable
discretion in statutory cases that they employ in common law
and constitutional cases.' 42 Indeed, judges should not interpret
Congress's silence against discretion to balance equities because
the reasons for such discretion in common law cases pertain
fully in statutory cases as well.' 43
Plater argues, however, that the Court's statement in
Hecht regarding balancing is dicta and that Congress has grown
to depend upon courts refusing to balance the equities in statutory cases. 144 Yet, courts do balance the equities in statutory
cases, 145 and Congress has generally declined to ban the practice such that balancing in statutory cases has become a "background value" that legislation incorporates. 146
3.

Avoiding Unconstitutional Delegations
of Legislative Power

Whether Congress grants judges the power to balance equities expressly or through silence, Congress's reliance on judges
to mold injunctive relief raises the question of whether such
grants should be considered unconstitutional delegations of leg141. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944). This conclusion
seems sound as long as the legislative decision does not somehow undermine
the article III role of courts, see U.S. CONST. art. III, such as by requiring
courts to issue unmanageable injunctions that prevent the conduct of essential
judicial business, or run afoul of some more specific constitutional prohibition,
such as the due process clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
142. 321 U.S. at 330. This conclusion fits courts' general willingness to import common law doctrines into statutory settings even when the statute is silent on the question of whether the common law doctrine applies. See, e.g.,
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S.
806, 814 (1945) (applying unclean hands doctrine in patent case).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 133-40.
144. See Plater, supra note 22, at 553-54.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 85-98.
146. Professors Richard Stewart and Cass Sunstein have argued that the
question of whether Congress intended to allow an implied private cause of action should be analyzed in terms of a set of practices that have become background values to legislative decisions. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public
Programsand PrivateRights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (1982).
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islative powers that violate separation of powers principles. 47
The delegation doctrine has its textual home in article I of the
Constitution, which provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in" the legislative process. 48
Although the judicial discretion involved in the principle proposed for guiding courts in fashioning injunctive relief could be
justified by calling it an exercise of judicial power under article
III,149 that justification depends on label rather than substance.' 5 0 Indeed, a judicial decision to allow a violation to continue might also be called a legislative rather than a judicial
function. Congressional reliance on judges to balance equities,
however, does not violate the delegation doctrine because of
147. This Author has argued elsewhere that the delegation doctrine ought
to be taken seriously. Schoenbrod, The DelegationDoctrine: Could the Court
Give it Substance?, 83 MIcH. L. REV. 1223, 1224-27 (1985). Scholars and courts
also have begun to scrutinize the legitimacy of long-standing practices that
raise separation of powers issues. See, e.g., A Symposium on Administrative
Law: The Uneasy Constitutional Status of Administrative Agencies, 36 Am.
U.L. REv. 277 (1987).
148. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
149. Id. at art. HI,§ 1.
150. Justice Stevens in his dissent in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo criticized the majority for just this sort of decision by label. See 456 U.S. 305, 330
(1982). He commented that the majority
refused to allow federal judges to supplement the Clean Water Act]
by enjoining a nuisance, whereas in this case the question is whether
a federal judge may create a loophole in the [statutory] scheme by refusing to enjoin a violation. Why a different standard should be used
to define the scope of judicial discretion in these two situations is not
explained.
Id. at 330-31. He contrasted the Weinberger Court's refusal to read the Clean
Water Act as implicitly preempting equitable discretion with another decision
of the Court, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, in which the Court read the same
statute as implicitly preempting the common law of interstate pollution, 451
U.S. 304, 317-19 (1981). See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 330-31. The Court in City
of Milwaukee reasoned that separation of powers concerns should prompt
courts to interpret statutes to avoid courts "develop[ing] national policy" except when Congress clearly failed to deal with an issue that state law cannot
adequately resolve. See 451 U.S. at 313-14. In contrast, the Court in Weinberger argued that a proper understanding of the relationship between the
courts and Congress should prompt courts to interpret statutes to permit judicial discretion to balance the equities, unless Congress has clearly indicated to
the contrary. See 456 U.S. at 320.
The Weinberger majority, however, failed to explain why separation of
powers should lead to a seemingly opposite result in City of Milwaukee. This
Article provides a justification by outlining some differences between establishing generally applicable rules of conduct, which the Court in City of Milwaukee refused to do, see 451 U.S. at 312-13, and granting exceptions from such
rules, which the Court in Weinberger did do, see 456 U.S. at 316-18, and by
showing that these differences are critical to the purposes of the delegation
doctrine.
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critical differences between administrative lawmaking, which
involves laying down generally applicable rules of conduct, and
formulating injunctive relief under the proposed principle,
which involves granting exceptions to such rules of conduct.
First, administrative lawmaking differs from formulating
injunctive relief in that executive rules can have a scope much
broader than judicial injunctions. A court issuing an injunction
151
may bind only the parties and those acting on their behalf,
whereas an executive promulgating a rule controls the conduct
of all who come within the rule's terms. Moreover, balancing
the equities under the proposed principle limits the judge's discretion in deciding what conduct an injunction can reach. Unlike an executive establishing a rule of conduct, a judge
formulating an injunction can reduce but not add to the defendant's obligations. 152 Injunctions that deviate from the statutory
rule to reduce the defendant's obligations will be rare because
they are permitted only if a factor not reflected in the statute's
formulation exists and such deviation comports with statutory
goals.
Second, although judges and executives both inquire into
the relationship between the proposed conduct and the relevant
goals, this inquiry involves important differences between the
role of a judge determining the scope of an injunction and that
of an executive establishing a rule of conduct. Executives, for
example, make a much broader goals-related inquiry than
judges. The executive considers the relationship between the
rule and the relevant policy goals under all of the general factual instances in which it will apply-a quintessential legislative function. The judge, on the other hand, examines the
relationship between the injunction and the statutory goals
under the single set of facts before the court-a quintessential
judicial function. Additionally, executives also have more discretion to prioritize between competing goals. Statutory rules
often guide the judge regarding the relative priority of competing goals, whereas delegations of legislative power to executives
typically do not lay down rules of conduct and therefore leave
the priority among competing policy goals to administrative
discretion.
As a result of these differences between drafting an injunction under the proposed principle and establishing a general
151.

FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d).

152. This assertion is the primary topic of Part III, see infra text accompanying notes 214-300.
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rule of conduct, decisions about the scope of injunctions do not
undercut the constitutional purposes of the delegation doctrine.
Justice Harlan has stated that the delegation doctrine serves
two functions critical to maintaining the separation of powers
mandated by the Constitution. 53 First, delegation ensures that
"the fundamental policy decisions in our society" are made by a
body immediately accountable to the public rather than an unaccountable, appointed official.154 Second, "it prevents judicial
review from becoming [a meaningless exercise] by providing
the courts with some measure against which to judge the offi155
cial action that has been challenged."'
Regarding the delegation doctrine's accountability purpose,
judicial decision making about the scope of injunctions does not
shield legislators from electoral responsibility the way that delegation to an agency does. In delegating to an agency, Congress
establishes goals and commands an agency to lay down rules to
achieve them. In doing so, Congress will take credit for achieving the goals, but the agency will receive the blame for the
rules' inevitable costs because it is the agency, not Congress,
which announces the restrictions. In contrast, when Congress
promulgates rules of conduct, it cannot escape electoral accountability on the pretense that courts really issue the rulesinjunctions-that restrict conduct and impose costs. Moreover,
as a practical matter, voters will blame the legislature for the
rules' costs because under the principle proposed for fashioning
injunctive relief, judges will rarely issue injunctions that deviate from the legislated rule. Moreover, the plaintiffs may be
able to seek damages rather than injunctive relief because the
statute may create a private cause of action or set the stage for
common law liability.
Although legislators remain accountable, the approach proposed for fashioning injunctive relief would give judges, who
are not politically accountable, the power to make the policy
decision to deviate from a statutory rule. The proposed principle does, however, provide articulated standards for issuing injunctions that constrain judges' conduct far more than Congress
restrains agencies' conduct in promulgating rules of conduct.
Moreover, injunctions formulated under the proposed principles are of limited scope, affecting only the parties and their
153.

See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (dissenting) (foot-

note omitted).

154. Id.
155. Id.
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immediate representatives and reaching only a limited range of
conduct. Judicial decisions about injunctions, therefore, generally do not compromise the delegation doctrine's purpose of ensuring that only bodies accountable to the people make
fundamental policy decisions.
The second purpose of the delegation doctrine, to provide a
meaningful measure for judicial review of official action to ensure compliance with the legislative will, is sometimes undercut
by rules promulgated by administrative agencies. 15 6 Requiring
the government to regulate on the basis of decisions reached in
the legislative process serves the fundamental purpose of protecting the public and individual rights from the power of special interest groups.157 The Constitution's framers made it
difficult for factions to use government power by allowing the
exercise of legislative power only when the House, the Senate,
and the President concur or when the House and the Senate
vote to override a presidential veto. To further frustrate factional power, the framers required different constituencies to
select the members of those political institutions and gave the
members different tenures of office.' 5 8 When Congress delegates lawmaking power to the executive it eliminates these protections because it gives legislative power to an individual or an
agency that tends to represent only a fraction of the interests
represented in the legislative process. 159 Rules promulgated by
the executive, therefore, do not satisfy the requirement that all
coercive governmental action pass through the legislative pro160
cess's protective filter.
In contrast, judicial decisions regarding the scope of injunctions do not undercut the delegation doctrine's requirement
that rules promulgated by bodies unaccountable to the public
pass through the legislative filter to ensure against government
by faction. First, the very unaccountability of judges-their independence from the political process-insulates them from the
influence of factions. Consequently, the fundamental interest
156. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has upheld delegations to administrative agencies that undercut this purpose. See Schoenbrod, supra note 147,

at 1239-43.
157. Id. at 1283-89; Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That
Be: The ConstitutionalPurposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 Am. U.L. REV.
355, 371-81 (1987) [hereinafter Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers].
158. Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers, supra note 157, at 372-73. Indeed,
the framers thought that factions would have to face each other in Congress
and thus would frustrate each others' selfish agendas. Id. at 373-75.
159. Id. at 374-75.
160. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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underlying the doctrine's judicial review requirement, protecting the rights of individuals from the power of special interest
groups, is not compromised. Second, the principle proposed for
fashioning injunctive relief requires that judges do no more
than aim to put the statute's beneficiaries in their rightful position. The judge can waive legislative requirements but may
not-unlike an administrative agency-impose new obligations.
The judge can thus, at most, only enforce whatever coercive
government action that the legislative process already justified.
The distinction between imposing new obligations and
waiving existing ones, however, has had a checkered history as
a rationale for arguing that waivers are not unconstitutional
delegations of legislative authority. 161 Whether or not courts
would use the imposition-waiver distinction to uphold some
grants of powers in other contexts, 162 it does make sense as a
rationale for upholding judicial discretion to balance equities
because the legislature cannot easily disguise judicial impositions as judicial waivers. The legislature could not enact a statute and rely on courts not to enforce it except in rare cases,
because balancing the equities under the proposed principles
leads to the opposite result: it allows judges to waive the statutory rule only in exceptional cases. Thus, the legislature will
have to take the responsibility for the rule of liability that it
has enacted.
161. The imposition-waiver dichotomy has been used to strike down statutes that empower property owners in a neighborhood to impose zoning restrictions as a delegation of legislative power, while at the same time to uphold
statutes that allow property owners to waive the application of a zoning requirement. See S. SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNmENT
LAW 282-83 (2d ed. 1977). A legislature could, however, grant essentially the
same power to the property owners in either form. For instance, instead of
authorizing neighborhoods to impose a prohibition on apartment buildings, the
legislature could ban apartment buildings and give neighborhoods the power
to waive that ban. The imposition-waiver distinction probably made more
sense when it arose towards the beginning of the century, see Washington ez.
rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116, 121 (1928); Cusack Co. v.
City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1916); Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S.
137, 144-45 (1912), because courts could probably strike down the blanket ban
on apartment houses, which provided the pretext for the waiver, under the
less deferential standards for judicial review of legislation that prevailed at the
time.
162. The Court in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 67778 (1976), cited with seeming approval Roberge, Cusack, and Eubank, see supra
note 161. On the other hand, Justice Rehnquist in Larkin v. Grendel's Den
made essentially an imposition-waiver argument that garnered no support
from the other Justices. 459 U.S. 116, 127-29 (1982) (dissenting).
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APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLE TO
CONSTITUTIONAL AND COMMON LAw CASES

1. Suitability to the Judicial Role in Constitutional and
Common Law Cases
The proposed principle suits the role of judges deciding
cases based on statutory rules of liability.1 63 To make that principle applicable to constitutional and common law cases as well
as statutory cases, it must be rephrased in general terms:
The injunction should require the defendant to achieve the plaintiff's
rightful position unless (a) different relief is consistent with the goals
of the violated rule and (b) the case involves a factor justifying departure from the rule that was not reflected in its formulation, but the
injunction may never aim to achieve more than the plaintiff's rightful
position.

Proponents of the policy-making approach to balancing the
equities cannot reject such limitations on judges' discretion to
formulate injunctive relief in nonstatutory cases on the basis
that constitutions and common law precedents rarely specify a
remedy'6 4 because most statutes also do not delineate specific
remedies. 16 5 Plater does, however, try to justify permitting
broad discretion to grant injunctions in constitutional and common law cases while denying it in statutory cases on the basis
that constitutions and the common law provide rules of liability
in terms more open textured 166 than do statutory rules of liability.16 7 Plater argues that because judges have more discretion
in determining the scope of liability in constitutional and common law cases than in statutory cases, they should similarly
163. See supra notes 99-127 and accompanying text.
164. For example, the fifth amendment provides only that "just compensation" is the remedy for the taking of private property for a public purpose. See
U.S. CoNST. amend. V. Judges must determine on a case-by-case basis what
just compensation means. Most other constitutional provisions say nothing
about remedies for their breach.
165. The proposed approach for guiding judges in formulating injunctive
relief would not apply to statutes that mandate a remedy because a legislatively mandated remedy takes precedence over any judicial balancing of the
equities. See supra note 99.
166. The common law is even more open textured than constitutions in
that no written text other than precedent speaks to liability or remedy.
Although some scholars characterize common law as judge-made law, see J.
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE 191 (1954) (conceding that nonstatutory law is

judge-made law), more sophisticated accounts describe it as an articulation of
community custom, see, e.g., J. CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN GROWTH AND FUNC-

TION 191-93 (1907) (arguing that judges find rather than make law, even in
novel cases, by fitting facts into categories determined by custom).
167. Plater, supra note 22, at 531 n.26.

1988]

INJUNCTIONS

have more freedom in fashioning injunctive relief in such
cases. 168 In determining liability under statutes, common law,
and constitutions, however, Professor Ronald Dworkin asserts
that judges should interpret the law rather than make policy
decisions. 169 As a result, liability in those cases arguably is not
a product of discretion, 170 and therefore there is no discretion
in determining liability to independently justify discretion in
fashioning relief.
If judges disagree with Dworkin and believe that they
should make policy decisions in constitutional and common law
cases, judges should nevertheless apply the proposed principle
to guide the exercise of that discretion in formulating relief.
There is no persuasive reason to use different standards when
the relevant authority controlling liability is statutory as opposed to case law. If precedent-constitutional or common
law--controls the liability decision in the case at hand, the
judge's attitude toward that precedent in formulating relief
should be just as respectful as it would be toward a controlling
statute. As Professors Owen Fiss and Doug Rendleman suggest,
it would be bizarre if judges had more freedom to undercut
constitutional rights than statutory rights through remedial
discretion. 171
Even when precedent does not directly control the judge's
liability decision and the judge can base the decision upon policy, the proposed principle should still apply at the remedy
stage because it legitimizes the judge's exercise of discretion by
providing articulated limits. After fixing the rule of liability,
the judge may still not want to grant an injunction that
achieves the plaintiff's rightful position. The proposed principle would justify such a result if a remedy less than the plaintiff's rightful position does not conflict with the goals of the
rule of liability created by the judge and the case involves a factor not reflected in that rule. If these requirements are not
168. Plater presents his rule as constraining choices about injunctions only
in statutory cases, while suggesting that courts should have broad discretion in
constitutional cases because the law of liability in constitutional cases is judgemade. See Plater, supra note 22, at 531, n.26. The logic of his position suggests
the same approach applies to common law cases. Plater also seeks to distinguish statutory from other cases in terms of notice, id., but notice problems
can arise in the statutory context.
169. See R. DwoRKI, supra note 8, at 338-40, 310-12, 379-99.
170. Dworkin denies that there is a right answer, but affirms that there is
a correct approach. Id. at 257-58. That approach requires the judge to adopt
the view that best fits previous decisions. Id. at 228-31, 254-58.
171. 0. Fiss & D. RENDLEMAN, supra note 11, at 175.
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met and the judge denies full injunctive relief, the judge's decision ignores the policy concerns underlying the judge's own
rule of liability. Candor as well as giving the public and the bar
fair notice of the law's practical impact should compel the judge
to restate the rule of liability based on an appropriate policy rationale rather than to grant relief contrary to the spirit of the
judge's own rule of liability.
2.

Consistency with the Actual Approach Used in
Constitutional and Common Law Cases

In addition to being appropriate to the role of judges in
constitutional and common law cases, the principle proposed
for guiding judges in formulating injunctive relief seems to fit
actual judicial behavior in such cases. For example, in Brown v.
Board of Education (Brown II),172 the Court's order deviating
from strict enforcement of the constitutional rule and the
plaintiff's rightful position was consistent with constitutional
goals and justified by the presence of factors not considered by
the framers. After finding that discriminatory segregation existed in violation of the Constitution,17 3 the Court required the
defendants "to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscriminatory school system" but allowed time for the transition in the
famous "with all deliberate speed" formulation. 7 4 That approach, according to Professor Paul Gewirtz, was consistent
with constitutional goals because in the context of school desegregation, those goals are multidimensional. 175 They include social concerns beyond ending unconstitutional practices, such as
the education of all children, both black and white, during the
76
transition period.
The Court's order permitting the violation to continue
while the defendants made the transition to compliance also
was justified by factors not reflected in the constitutional rule
of liability. The Court considered that requiring prompt compliance with the Constitution was administratively difficult and
would interrupt the education of the children-factors not con172. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
173. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
174. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (remanding to district courts "to take such
proceedings and enter such orders and decrees consistent with this opinion as
are necessary and proper to admit to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate speed the parties to these cases").
175. Gewirtz, supra note 8, at 602.
176. Id. at 617-18.
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sidered in formulating the Constitution's rule.17 7 At the same
time, the Court refused to consider factors antithetical to the
plaintiffs' rights, 178 such as the desire to maintain the power to
segregate, because the framers had already considered those
factors in formulating the constitutional rule of liability.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman
(Lemon 11) 179 also illustrates the implicit use of the proposed
approach in constitutional case law. The Court had previously
struck down a state statute that provided financial aid for secular courses taught in parochial schools because it unconstitutionally entangled church and state. 180 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court affirmed a district court order allowing payments to the schools for courses taught before the statute was
found unconstitutional.' 8 ' The majority sounded the ancient
theme that equity courts "eschew rigid absolutes and look to
practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests."' 8 2 In reconciling those interests,
the Court argued that the payment, as a one-time event, did not
seriously compromise the constitutional interests involved in
the separation of church and state because it did not give the
state a continuing role in overseeing the church's educational
process.'8 3 Moreover, the parochial schools had relied in good
faith upon the statute in expending money before the statute
was declared unconstitutional.184 This reliance presented a special factor that justified departure from the plaintiff's rightful
position. Thus, failing to achieve the plaintiff's rightful position was justified under the proposed principle.
177. Id. at 606-08.
178. Id. As the Court in Brown 1I said. "[lit should go without saying that
the vitality of these constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply
because of disagreement with them." 349 U.S. at 300.
179. 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
180. Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon I), 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971).
181. Lemon II, 411 U.S. at 201.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 201-02.
184. Id- at 203-06. Three Justices joined in a vigorous dissent, questioning

whether the schools reasonably doubted their liability and implicitly suggesting that, even if they did, payments were improper. Id at 209-12 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Neither the majority nor the dissent set forth a coherent set of
principles to guide judges in balancing the equities.
Both Weinberger and Lemon I involved basically the same special factor.
reliance on an uncertain litigation position. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. 305, 320
(1982); Lemon II, 411 U.S. at 203-07. The Lemon H majority was not bothered

that "constitutional attack on the [statute] was plain from the outset." 411
U.S. at 207. Rather, the majority asked whether there was uncertainty about

the outcome. Id. at 205-06.
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The proposed principle not only describes judges' approach
in constitutional cases, but also that used by judges in leading
common law cases. In Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co.,185 for example, the defendant was held liable for creating a nuisance
but was nonetheless allowed to continue the violation as long as
it made payments to the plaintiffs. 186 Although the cement
company's monetary interest far exceeded the plaintiff's interest, 8 7 the judges performed more than a simple cost-benefit
analysis. 188 In addition to costs, the judges apparently considered that the case presented factors not reflected in the rule of
liability. The applicable nuisance law had accounted only for
the impact on the plaintiffs. 8 9 Additional factors presented included that the factory had already been built, that the employees depended on the factory's continued operation for their
jobs,190 and that the cement company had a good faith argument, because of the uncertainty of nuisance law, that it was
not a violator.' 9 '
185. 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). See generally
Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, rffwiency, and Nuisance Law, in FESTSCHRIFT (forthcoming) (reevaluating Boomer in new light).
186. 26 N.Y.2d at 222, 228, 257 N.E.2d at 871, 875, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 314, 319.
187. Id. at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
188. When scholars and students mischaracterize the Court's approach in
Boomer as a simple cost-benefit analysis, the judges appear to be policy makers when they balance the equities.
189. Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 871-72, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315; see
also J. DUKEMINIER & J. KRIER, PROPERTY 944 (1981) (noting that liability was
imposed solely on basis of damage to plaintiff).
190. See Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 225 n.*, 257 N.E.2d at 873 n.*, 309 N.Y.S.2d at
319 n.*. Removing the nuisance thus presented a different question than if the
prayer for relief had sought to prevent the nuisance from being constructed.
191. In contrast, in Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927),
the plaintiff had objected to the construction in advance and the defendant
had promised to control the pollution. Id. at 736. When it did not, the court
enforced the decree even though the costs of abatement far exceeded the benefit to plaintiff. Id. at 738-39.
Arguably, the cement company in Boomer lacked good faith because it
could have attempted to buy before construction whatever rights, however illdefined, its neighbors had to protection from the company's conduct. On the
other hand, the neighbors could have sought an injunction before construction,
thereby preventing the hardships upon which the cement company relied,
such as dependence of employees on the existing plant for their jobs. See
supra text accompanying notes 45-48. The cement company's greater knowledge as to the dimension of the problem may justify placing the burden on it.
Ordinarily, shifting the burden to the property owner, however, requires enactment of a permit requirement. See supra note 82 (discussing Clean Water
Act). The cement company would not act in good faith if it violated a permit
requirement without a colorable claim that the requirement did not apply to
the company. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
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Moreover, the relief ordered was consistent with the goals
of nuisance law. Those goals include, on an equal footing, promoting the productive uses of land while at the same time
avoiding disruptive uses.1 92 As Judge Hand stated in balancing
the equities in another nuisance case, "[t]he very right on
which the wronged party stands is a quantitative compromise
between two conflicting interests. '193 In Boomer the defendant
and the plaintiff were both using the land productively. Requiring the defendant to remove the nuisance, however, would
have resulted in a $45 million loss, whereas allowing the nuisance to continue caused the plaintiffs only $185,000 in damages. 194 The court's decision to deny the injunction on grounds
of undue hardship thus served the conflicting goals of nuisance
law by preserving a use vastly more productive than the use
harmed. Given that the remedy served the goals of nuisance
law and that the case presented factors not accounted for by
the rule of liability, a remedy achieving less than the plaintiff's
rightful position was consistent with the proposed principle.
Because nuisance law has equal regard for competing goals,
the judge in Boomer had considerable latitude to balance the
equities to determine what relief would serve those goals. Unlike with nuisance law, however, when the applicable rules of
liability do not attempt to weigh conflicting policy goals evenly
but instead serve a predominant goal, the proposed principle allows the judge less latitude to deny relief based upon a balancing of the equities. Trespass law, for example, serves the
predominant purpose of protecting property, and thus when the
defendant unlawfully enters the plaintiff's property, the judge
has little if any discretion to deny relief based on balancing: the
purpose of the rule of liability is served by strictly enforcing
the rule. Discussing this idea in the context of contract law,
Professor Frederick Maitland states:
We hear much less of [balancing the equities] when there is a contract, and the applicant is not bound to show that he has already suffered actual damage. When a man has definitely contracted not to do
a certain thing, it is not for him to say that it will be greatly to his
convenience, and not much to the inconvenience of the other party,
that he should be allowed to do it.195
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 826(a) (1979).
193. Staso Milling, 18 F.2d at 738.
194. Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 223, 257 N.E.2d at 872, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
195. F. MArrLAND, supra note 41, at 327-28. Professor Anthony Kronman
argues similarly that judges are wrong not to honor contracts that call for specific performance rather than damage remedies. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. Cai. L. REV. 351, 369-76 (1978). Maitland is talking about balancing
192.
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Thus in a contract case, once the court determines as an initial
matter that the prerequisites to injunctive relief are satsified, in
fashioning the relief the judge will rarely balance the equities
to refuse relief unless the case presents a factor such as laches,
196
estoppel, or mistake.
An informative study by Professor M.T. Van Hecke demonstrates that, in practice, judges apply this concept that they
have less room to balance equities in fashioning injunctive relief when the rule of liability has a predominant policy goal. 197
Van Hecke surveyed 112 cases in which the plaintiffs sought injunctions ordering the defendant to remove or remodel structures that violated covenants restricting building imposed in
deeds or contracts. 198 Injunctions issued in seventy of these
cases. 19 9 In the cases that did balance equities to deny injunctive relief, relative hardship alone never justified denying an injunction;20 0 it had to be both extreme and coupled with some
other factor such as laches, estoppel, or mistake. 201
the equities, a question that arises after the court determines that the remedy
at law is inadequate.
196. See infra note 201 and accompanying text.
197. Van Hecke, Injunctions to Remove or Remodel Structures Erected in
Violation of Building Restrictions,32 TEx. L. REV. 521, 531 (1954).
198. Id. at 528.
199. Id. In all the cases, the courts had determined that the restriction was
still valid and that it had been violated. Id. at 521, 526-27.
200. Id. at 528. To the extent relative hardship counted, it helped defendants only when there was a large disparity between hardship to the defendant
and hardship to the plaintiff, as in Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309
N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970). See Van Hecke, supra note 197, at 527-28.
201. Id. at 528-29. Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109
(Okla. 1962), cert denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963), seems contrary to the proposed
principle and wrongly decided. In Peevyhouse a farmer allowed a coal company to mine coal only after obtaining a contractual promise to restore the
land when finished. Id. at 111. When the coal company breached its promise,
the farmer sued for the cost of specific performance. Id. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court allowed damages based only on the considerably smaller estimate of the reduced value of the land. Id. at 114. That the suit was for monetary relief should not make a difference. See D. LAYCoCK, supra note 1, at 928
(asking whether result should not be same whether plaintiffs seek specific
performance or damages for cost of completion). The coal company had explicitly accepted the inconvenience of which it later complained. Peevyhouse,
382 P.2d at 111. It could not claim therefore that laches, estoppel, or mistake
changed the equities. To the contrary, the company probably never intended
to perform. Laycock shows that courts differ in their treatment of cases like
Peevyhouse. See D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 927-29.
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GRANTING MORE THAN THE PLAINTIFF'S
RIGHTFUL POSITION

Part II of this Article explored when judges may issue an
injunction that allows the defendant to achieve less than the
plaintiff's rightful position under the doctrine of balancing the
equities. This Part considers when judges may issue an injunction that requires more under the doctrine of tailoring the
remedy.
At first blush tailoring the remedy appears to differ from
balancing the equities. Tailoring requires that the remedy aim
to achieve the plaintiff's rightful position, while balancing appears to allow remedies that differ from that position. As will
be shown, however, a properly tailored injunction may sometimes contain terms that go beyond the plaintiff's rightful position to avoid falling short of it. The doctrines also seem
different because tailoring appears to constrain the court's policy role while balancing the equities under the policy-making
approach appears to allow wide-ranging policy choices. Balancing as properly understood under the proposed principle, however, constrains judicial policy making by requiring that
injunctive relief comport with the legislature's goals and its decision regarding how to realize those goals. Under the tailoring
doctrine, the same constraints limit when an injunction's terms
may achieve more than the plaintiff's rightful position.
The doctrines do, however, differ in the context in which
they are used.20 2 Yet, even within a single context, judges
sometimes slip from using the language of one doctrine to that
of the other without acknowledging that they have taken up a
new doctrine,2 0 3 which suggests that the difference between the
doctrines is only semantic-judges applying different labels to
4
the same doctrine applied in different contexts. 20
Because the doctrines differ only in semantics and not in
202. Judges tend to invoke balancing the equities when they consider an
injunction that achieves less than the plaintiff's rightful position, particularly
in nuisance and environmental cases, see, e.g., Boomer, 26 N.Y.2d at 225-26, 257
N.E.2d at 873, 309 N.Y.S.2d at 317, and tend to invoke tailoring the remedy
when they consider an injunction that achieves more than that position, such
as in recent civil rights cases, see, e.g., Fiss, supra note 22, at 46-48.
203. D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 52-55.
204. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971) ("The task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and collective
interests, the condition that offends the Constitution."); Environmental Defense Fund v. Marsh, 651 F.2d 983, 1006 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The court should tailor its relief to fit each particular case, balancing the environmental concerns
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substance, the same proposed principle should guide judges in
deciding whether to grant more or less than the plaintiff's
rightful position. The next section lays out the basic doctrine of
tailoring the remedy. The following section considers competing approaches to the case law, and the final section analyzes
which approach best serves the judicial role.

A.

THE

BASIC DOCTRINE: TAILORING THE REMEDY

The tailoring doctrine requires that the injunction fit the
wrong or, in other words, aim to achieve the plaintiff's rightful
position.20 5 Accordingly, a preventive injunction should try to
prevent repetitions of the wrong, and a reparative injunction
should aim to put the plaintiff in the position that would have
20 6
existed but for the wrong.
Newman v. Alabama 20 7 illustrates the tailoring doctrine in
both the preventive and reparative contexts. In Newman the
court upheld an injunction's provisions designed to eliminate
prison overcrowding that violated the eighth amendment. 20
Those preventive provisions attempted to ensure against repetitions of the wrong of overcrowding. 20 9 The court overturned
other provisions aimed at rehabilitating prisoners because rehabilitation did not prevent the wrong of overcrowding and was
not a constitutional right.210 The court, however, upheld a provision requiring recreational programs to repair the effects of
of NEPA against the larger interests of society that might be adversely affected by an overly broad injunction.").
Cases described by some as instances in which the courts used balancing
the equities to allow a violation to continue can be better understood as the
courts tailoring the remedy to fit the violation. For instance, Professor Russ
Winner uses balancing the equities to describe a court's decision not to set
aside a lease sale of offshore oil drilling rights and enjoin further drilling, despite a violation of the NEPA. See Winner, The Chancellor'sFoot and Environmental Law: A Call for Better Reasoned Decisions on Environmental
Injunctions, 9 ENVTL. L. 477, 515-16 (1979) (citing Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d
465 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in part, 439 U.S. 922 (1978)). The violation in Andrus,
however, involved inadequate analysis of how best to protect the environment,
which the court held could be resolved without prejudice after the sale. See
580 F.2d at 485. The court thus denied the injunction because it determined
that relief narrower than enjoining the sale fit the wrong. Id.
205. See D. DOBBS, supra note 3, at 487; Fiss, supra note 22, at 46-50 (1979);
Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 732-34 (1986); Gewirtz, supra note 8, at 589-91.
206. See 0. FISS, supra note 131, at 8-12; Laycock, supra note 96, at 1073-75.
207. 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd in part,438 U.S. 781 (1978).
208. Id. at 288.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 291.
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prior wrongful overcrowding.2 11 In the court's judgment, recreation rather than rehabilitation was the appropriate remedy for
overcrowding because it presumably put the prisoners in the
position they would have been in but for the overcrowding. 21 2
Drafting preventive and reparative orders requires judges
to make judgments about how to accomplish the plaintiff's
rightful position. In drafting reparative injunctions, judges do
not know with certainty what conditions would have prevailed
but for the wrong or how to replicate them. Rather, the injunction frequently provides only a substitute to make up for the
wrong, such as the recreational program in Newman. In drafting preventive injunctions, the wrong does not uniquely determine the injunction's provisions. Judges adjust the terms of
preventive injunctions based on their perception of the defendant's predilection for illegal conduct. For example, if a large
corporation violated a statute forbidding age, race, or religious
discrimination by denying someone a job at a corporate branch
office on the basis of age, the court might enjoin the defendant
from discriminating against the plaintiff or any person, at that
branch or at any location, and on the basis of age or any illegal
purpose. The judge would likely narrow the injunction's scope
if the prior discrimination stemmed from the branch manager's
animus against older people instead of the company's policy to
hire only middle-aged white men. 213
B.

CONTRASTING APPROACHES TO THE TAILORING DOCTRINE

1.

The Policy-Making Approach

Professors Chayes and Fiss object to the tailoring doctrine
on several grounds. First, they argue that the doctrine has led
to wrong results in many cases. 21 4 Their discussion of these decisions, however, ends up criticizing how the Court defined the
211. The court stated that the provisions requiring recreational programs
were not designed to serve any preventive purposes. Id. at 291 ("We do this
simply because such facilities may play an important role in extirpating the effects of the conditions which undisputably prevailed in these prisons at the
time the District Court entered its order.").

212. See id.
213. See, e.g., Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 734 n.6
(5th Cir. 1977) ("[A]n injunction's scope should not exceed the likely scope of
future violations.") (citing Hodgson v. Corning Glass Works, 474 F.2d 226, 236-

37 (2d Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d 818, 826-27
(5th Cir. 1972)). 1
214.

See Chayes, supra note 51, at 45-52; Fiss, supra note 22, at 46-50.
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plaintiff's rights,215 how it conceived of the wrong committed,21 6 or how it conceived of the plaintiff's rightful position in
an unduly narrow way2 7 rather than the Court's application of
the tailoring doctrine. This criticism, therefore, really attacks
the Court's conception of the rules of liability and not the substance of the tailoring doctrine.
215. Chayes, supra note 51, at 45-52; Fiss, supra note 22, at 46-50.
216. They object to cases such as Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), Rizzo
v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
Chayes's misconception is clearest when he cites cases such as Wolfish as demonstrating the evils of the concept of fit. See Chayes, supra note 51, at 51. In
fact, the Court in Wolfish never approached the issue of remedies, dismissing
the claims at the liability stage. See 441 U.S. at 563.
The Court in Rizzo held that systemic remedies against police department
violence were inappropriate under the tailoring doctrine because the Court
conceived of the wrong as stemming from the acts of individual police officers
rather than departmental policy. See 423 U.S. at 377. In other words, if departmental policy had caused the wrong, the propensity for future wrong
would have been department-wide and the tailoring doctrine would not have
stood in the way of a systemic remedy. Id.
In Milliken and other desegregation cases, Chayes and Fiss would have
the Court's school segregation remedies aimed at de facto segregation because
they view the fourteenth amendment as requiring an end to de facto as well as
de jure segregation. See Chayes, supra note 51, at 45-52; Fiss, supra note 22, at
46-50; see also D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 259-60 (1985) (explaining difference between de facto and de jure segregation in remedies context); Gewirtz,
supra note 205, at 736-37 (discussing problems with view that Constitution
mandates integration without regard for cause of nonintegration). See generally Chang, The Bus Stops Here: Defining the ConstitutionalRight of Equal
Educational Opportunity and an Appropriate Remedial Process, 63 B.U.L.
REV. 1 passim (1983) (analyzing busing remedy in racial discrimination cases).
Thus, Chayes and Fiss object to the rules of liability adopted by the Court in
the segregation cases, rather than to the tailoring doctrine itself.
217. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977). In
Brinkman the Court remanded the case to determine whether the school
board had discriminated on the basis of race. Id. at 421. If so, the district court
must, in constructing a remedy, "determine how much incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial distribution of the Dayton school
population as presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to
what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional violations." Id.
at 420. Under this concept of their rightful position, the plaintiffs arguably
were entitled to an order halting the discriminatory practices. Such an order
might have included the drawing of color-blind school attendance zones.
Redrawing attendance lines could have resulted in near complete racial separation if the races already lived in separate neighborhoods. Unless past official
discrimination had caused racial segregation by neighborhood, however, the
plaintiffs could not have gotten the affirmative action of redrawing of school
attendance lines to promote integration. Thus, if the board had already
stopped discriminating, Dayton's concept of the plaintiffs' rightful position
might have produced for the plaintiffs no more than a piece of paper condemning past discrimination but requiring no official action to undo the impression
that local officials condone segregation.
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Attacking the substance of the tailoring doctrine, however,
Chayes and Fiss also argue that the tailoring doctrine is too
mechanistic because, as they understand it, it makes the injunction depend on one variable-the wrong committed. 218 As a result Chayes suggests that the tailoring doctrine prevents
reparative orders because, in those injunctions, the remedy is
not the exact reverse of the wrong and the doctrine seems to
require that the remedy flow logically and directly from the
wrong.21 9 Yet the plaintiff's rightful position provides the
model for the judge tailoring the injunction, and the rightful
position concept includes undoing past wrongs as well as
preventing future ones. Consequently, Chayes220errs in suggesting that tailoring bars reparative injunctions.
Fiss illustrates this criticism of the tailoring doctrine with a
case in which a police department had violated the fourth
amendment by searching homes in a minority neighborhood
during a manhunt based on uncorroborated anonymous tips. 221
Although the court could have prevented repetitions of the
wrong by requiring the police chief to either sanction officers
for searching illegally or prohibit warrantless searches absent a
hot pursuit justification, it chose instead to enjoin only searches
based on uncorroborated anonymous tips. 2 22 All three potential

remedies had the aim of preventing the wrong, but their scope
218.

See Chayes, supranote 51, at 45-52; Fiss, supra note 22, at 46-50.

219. Chayes cites Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), as a rare instance
of the Burger Court not applying the tailoring principle, see Chayes, supra

note 51, at 49-50, perhaps because its application would have stood in the way
of plainly appropriate relief. In Milliken the injunction, in addition to ordering an end to school segregation, directed the defendants to provide remedial
education for those children who had been the victims of past school segregation. 433 U.S. at 286-88. For Chayes, tailoring would bar this provision because, as he understands the doctrine, the remedy must be logically and
directly deduced from the wrong. See Chayes, supra note 51, at 45. Because
the defendants did not become liable by illegally withholding remedial education, they cannot be required to provide it under the tailoring principle.
Chayes, however, construes the tailoring principle as more limiting than necessary by failing to note that the remedial education was reparative and that
reparative relief must, by its very nature, be in the way of substitution for
what plaintiffs should have rightly had in the first place-nonseparate and
equal education. There is no unique answer to what is an appropriate substitute for such education, but the tailoring doctrine does require the judge to
find a substitute that compensates for the wrong that led to liability rather
than some other wrong that has come to the judge's attention.
220. See supra note 219.
221. See Fiss, supra note 22, at 48 (discussing Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d
197, 201 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc)).
222. Lankford, 364 F.2d at 206.
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differed-some prohibiting otherwise lawful conduct. According to Fiss, the judge's choice between remedies should depend
on variables other than the wrong, such as whether the narrower remedy would achieve its aim 2 23 and the degree to which

a broader remedy would intrude on local government. 22 4 Fiss
argues that the tailoring doctrine is therefore deficient because
it obscures the court's choices between remedies and because it
rules out decrees that would prohibit lawful conduct to eliminate unlawful conduct.225 Fiss's argument thus suggests that
without principles to guide its application, the tailoring doctrine
is no more than disguised policy making.
Abandoning the tailoring doctrine, however, is not a satisfactory alternative because doing so simply permits judges to
engage openly in completely unconstrained policy making.
Without tailoring, nothing stops the judge in Fiss's case from
imposing an internal review procedure on the police department, regardless of any constitutional violation, simply out of a
belief that such procedures are a good idea. Chayes's and Fiss's
position that the tailoring doctrine should not depend on the
wrong committed ignores courts' long-standing and appropriate
concern with ensuring that injunctions aim to eradicate the
legal wrong before the court rather than account for some
other item on the social agenda. For example, when one business steals another's trade secrets regarding the design of a
new, unmarketed product, the victim may not have the secrets'
use enjoined beyond the time that it would take the thief to reverse engineer the product once it was introduced. A longer injunction period to implement the court's notions of, for
example, fair competition, would punish the defendant and put
the plaintiff in a better position than it would have been in
without the theft.226 Consequently, requiring courts to tailor

remedies to the wrong committed seems desirable.
Chayes and Fiss also imply that the Supreme Court in227
vented the tailoring doctrine to crimp civil rights litigation,
223. Fiss, supra note 22, at 48.
224. Id. at 48-49.
225. Id. at 50 (discussing specific decree as to prison overcrowding). Decrees prohibiting lawful conduct in the process of stopping unlawful conduct
are necessary in some circumstances. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying
text.
226. Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d
134, 142-44 (9th Cir. 1965). Laycock suggests that allowing a longer injunction
is essentially punitive. See D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 245-46 (1985).
227. See Chayes, supra note 51, at 45-52; Fiss, supra note 22, at 46-50.
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but courts have in fact long applied the doctrine, whether or
not labeled as such, in distinct areas of law to gear relief to the
plaintiff's rightful position. For example, in administrative
law, the opponent of an agency action who convinces a court
that the agency based its decision upon improper grounds ordinarily cannot get the agency's decision reversed. 228 Rather, the
court will remand the decision to the agency with instructions
to make its decision upon a proper basis. 229 Tailoring requires a
remand rather than a reversal because a remand puts the
agency's opponent in the position it would have been in but for
the improper decision. Reversing the agency's decision would
put the agency's opponent in a position better than its rightful
position. 230 Similarly, in labor law, a union that proves that an
employer violated the National Labor Relations Act requirement to bargain in good faith cannot get an order to make the
employer accept its bargaining position, but it can get an order
228. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 772 F.2d
1043, 1052-56 (2d Cir. 1985) (remanding directly to Corps of Engineers); see also
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 200 (1947) ('"he administrative process
had taken an erroneous rather than a final turn. Hence we carefully refrained
from expressing any views as to the propriety of any order rooted in the
proper and relevant considerations.").
229. See Sierra Club, 772 F.2d at 1056.
230. The remand concept applies in other areas of law under different labels. For example, a judge that has found that a state institution violates the
Constitution will ordinarily begin the remedial process by ordering the defendants to propose a corrective plan rather than ordering specific corrective measures. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 & n.9 (1978) (dictum) (finding
that corrections department had been given numerous opportunities to remedy
prison conditions); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973) (noting
that state correctional facilities should have first opportunity to correct their
errors); Dean v. Coughlin, 804 F.2d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding that court
should have used prison officials' remedial plan as guide). The plaintiff gets
no more than a remand in the first instance because plaintiff only has the
right to require that the state political processes obey the Constitution, not to
require that the question of corrective measures be removed to a presumably
more sympathetic judicial forum. Professor Fletcher has shown how courts
tend to be as unobtrusive as possible, consistent with the purpose of protecting
the plaintiff's rights. See letcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L.J. 635, 649-50 (1982) (noting that district court judges try to avoid exercising remedial discretion).
For a final example, a judge, upon finding that a state violates conditions
attached to a federal grant, will ordinarily enjoin the state from spending the
money except in compliance with the condition rather than order the state to
comply with the condition. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 420-23 (1970).
The injunction must give the state a chance to decide whether it wants to return the grant rather than comply to avoid putting the plaintiff in a better
than rightful position.
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requiring the employer to bargain. 23 ' In effect the issue is remanded to the bargaining process, which achieves the plaintiff's rightful position.
Although tailoring generally aims to achieve the plaintiff's
rightful position, courts occasionally depart from the tailoring
doctrine by aiming to put the plaintiff in a better than rightful
position. For example, the Fifth Circuit upheld an injunction
that, in the court's own words, did "have a twist to it."' 2 2 The
defendants had violated an employment contract that required
them to keep certain files belonging to the plaintiff confidential
during the employment period.233 The Fifth Circuit upheld the
district court's order enjoining disclosure forever because the
defendants' breach was blatant.23 Professor Douglas Laycock
argues that courts in such cases act as if they have a "roving
2 3 5 Although these cases 23 6 come from
commission to do good."1
lower courts and are infrequent, their failure to justify their aberrant results provides an important reason for courts to articulate clearly a transsubstantive measure of injunctive relief to
guide their application of the tailoring doctrine.
2.

A More Compliant Approach

Courts say that an injunction may not aim to put the plaintiff in a better than rightful position. Yet sometimes they issue
injunctions that prohibit the defendant from carrying on otherwise lawful conduct in a way that goes beyond the plaintiff's
rightful position. The explanation for this apparent paradox
lies in the distinction between an injunction's aims and its
terms. The injunction's aim must be the plaintiff's rightful position, but to achieve that aim, its terms may impose conditions
on the defendant that require actions going beyond the plaintiff's rightful position. Under the proposed principle, such
terms would be appropriate when requiring more of the defendant serves the goals of the violated rule and the case involves a factor not reflected in the rule's formulation that
justifies departing from it. For example, a court concerned
231. See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1970) (holding
that Board may require parties to bargain regarding union dues checkoff
clause but cannot compel party to accept specific contractual provision).
232. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Stidham, 658 F.2d 1098,
1102 (5th Cir. 1981).

233. Id. at 1101.
234. See id. at 1102-03.
235.

D. LAYCOCK, supra note 1, at 251.

236. For additional cases, see id. at 245, 251, 260.
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about future unconstitutional searches and seizures could require new police procedures not constitutionally mandated if
such procedures were necessary to ensure compliance with the
Constitution. The injunction's terms, therefore, may have to go
beyond the plaintiff's rightful position to avoid falling short of
that position.
At least two situations demand injunctive relief imposing
terms that overreach the plaintiff's rightful position to achieve
that position. First, the injunction may have to prohibit lawful
conduct to ensure that the court can effectively enforce the
plaintiff's rightful position. An injunction ordering the defendant to cease trespassing on the plaintiff's land lends itself to
easy enforcement. When the judge cannot easily demarcate a
clear boundary between legal and illegal conduct, however, a
resistant defendant could take advantage of that uncertainty to
avoid meaningful preventive action.23 7 To overcome such
resistance, the injunction must specify precisely what the defendant can and cannot do. Thus, the injunction's goal of
achieving compliance may justify terms that intrude upon matters that the law of liability, if it had never been breached,
leaves entirely to the defendant's discretion. 238 Moreover, the
defendant's resistance presents a factor not accounted for in
formulating the law of liability.
Second, an injunction's terms may accomplish more than
the plaintiff's rightful position when achieving exactly that position is impossible. In McCarthy v. Briscoe2 39 the state of
Texas had unconstitutionally prohibited candidates who had
unsuccessfully bid for a party's presidential nomination from
appearing on the election ballot.2O Plaintiff McCarthy's rightful position was to have the same opportunity to appear on the
ballot as anyone else.2 1 To appear on the ballot, McCarthy
237. See, e.g., Henderson & Pearson, Implementing FederalEnvironmental
Policies: The Limits of Aspirational Commands, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1429,
1434-38 (1978) (finding that inherent vagueness in defining command itself
complicates enforcement of aspirational commands).
238. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687 (1978). Similarly, in administrative law, a court will sometimes reverse the decision of a particularly resistant agency because it would "serve no useful purpose to ask the
Commission to reconsider ....
The administrative conduct reflected in this
record is beyond repair." See Office of Communications of the United Church
of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d 543, 550 (D.C. Cir. 1969). On the other hand, en-

joining lawful activity must be necessary to protect the plaintiff's rightful position. See Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1983).
239. 429 U.S. 1317 (1976).

240. Id. at 1318.
241. Id. at 1323.
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needed a large number of signatures but he had not gathered
signatures because of Texas's bar against independent candidates, nor could he gather the necessary signatures before the
state had to begin printing the ballots.2A2 As a result the court
could not put McCarthy in his rightful position. It either had to
do less-allow Texas to leave him off the ballot-or more-put
him on the ballot despite the lack of signatures. 243 The court
ultimately ordered Texas to put McCarthy on the ballot because the signature requirement's purpose-to prevent a laundry list ballot of unknown candidates-was satisfied because
McCarthy was a well-known candidate. 2 " The result was further justified by McCarthy's having had insufficient time to collect the requisite signatures-a factor that the legislature had
not considered in formulating its rule of liability.
To justify an injunction that has terms going beyond the
plaintiff's rightful position, those terms must not only be necessary to prevent falling short of the plaintiff's rightful position,
but also must be consistent with the purposes of the rule of liability. Indeed, the Supreme Court struck down an order requiring an employer to accede to the union's bargaining position
when the employer would likely continue to fail to bargain in
good faith.2 5 Although the order was necessary to achieve an
approximation of the plaintiff's rightful position, the Court
considered the order inconsistent with Congress's goal of preserving freedom of contract.246 In fashioning injunctive relief, a
242. Id. at 1318.
243. Id. at 1322.
244. Id. at 1323.
245. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 107-08 (1970); supra note
231 and accompanying text.
246. Id. at 108. If the Board did no more than order the employer to accede
to bargain in good faith as the statute requires, see § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982), the employer could evade this
statutory requirement by doing no more than shamming good faith bargaining.
So the Board ordered the employer to accede to the union's position, see 397
U.S. at 101, which may well have approximated what good faith bargaining
would have produced. Even though such an order may have achieved the
plaintiff's rightful position, the Supreme Court was concerned that the remedy ran counter to one of the Act's goals:
The Board's remedial powers under § 10 of the Act are broad, but
they are limited to carrying out the policies of the Act itself. One of
these fundamental policies is freedom of contract. While the parties'
freedom of contract is not absolute under the Act, allowing the Board
to compel agreement when the parties themselves are unable to agree
would violate the fundamental premise on which the Act is basedprivate bargaining under governmental supervision of the procedure
alone, without any official compulsion over the actual terms of the
contract.
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court would thus likely refuse to grant terms that overreach

the rightful position if it deemed them inconsistent with the
goals of the law of liability. Such a result would comport with
the proposed principle which requires that injunctions always
honor the rule of liability either by enforcing its rules or serving its purposes.
On the other hand, that an injunction would advance the
goals of the statute does not, in itself, justify terms achieving
more than the plaintiff's rightful position if doing so countermands a legislative choice as to how the statute's goals should
be achieved. Recalling the snail darter hypothetical, 247 TVA
had violated the Endangered Species Act by building a dam
that threatened a critical habitat of the snail darter.2 8 Barring
use of the dam so as to prevent damage to the habitat, the injunction aimed to give the benefit of the rule of liability-that
no federal agency shall damage a critical habitat-to what that
statute protected, the snail darter. 249 The injunction could not,
however, also require TVA to protect the snail darter from
farmers' harmful practices because, although the Act's purpose
is species preservation, its rule forbids damaging federal action
but does not require federal agencies to prevent damage by private actors. To permit an injunction to do so would countermand a legislative choice as to how the goals should be
achieved and thus be inconsistent with the principle proposed
to guide judges in tailoring remedies.
Under the proposed principle, however, the judge might require TVA to prevent the harm done by the farmers on a reparative theory. Assume that TVA's dam had damaged one of the
snail darter's critical habitats beyond repair and that the farmers are currently threatening another critical habitat upstream.
The judge could not restore the snail darter to its original position because the dam has already destroyed a habitat. The
judge could, however, order TVA to protect the upstream
habitat as reparation by substituting it for the habitat TVA illegally destroyed.250 This result satisfies the proposed principle's
Id. at 108 (footnotes omitted) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 160(c)).
247. See supra text accompanying note 31.
248. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 171 (1978), supra text accompanying
notes 24-29.
249. Perhaps it would be more proper, although less accurate, to say that
the injunction protected the interests in the species asserted by people with
standing.
250. See, e.g., Texas v. New Mexico, 107 S. Ct. 2279, 2283-84 (1987) (finding
that Court not limited to ordering prospective relief, but may impose retroac-
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requirement that an injunction aim for the plaintiff's rightful
position because the new habitat substitutes for the old one.
Even if the replacement habitat was somehow better than the
one originally destroyed and the injunction therefore put the
plaintiff in a better than rightful position, the result would be
justified if it was impossible to craft terms to achieve more precisely the rightful position. Such an injunction would satisfy
the proposed principle because it would serve the statute's goals
and TVA's illegal destruction of the original habitat provides a
factor not reflected in the rule's formulation that justifies departing from it.

C.

DOES THE PROPOSED PRINCIPLE HELP DECIDE CASES?

The recent clash over judicially imposed2' quotas under
the federal employment discrimination laws252 provides an interesting context in which to test the utility of the approach
proposed to guide judicial application of the tailoring doctrine.
The leading case, Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International
Ass'n v. EEOC,2 53 involved a union continuing racial discrimination that a district court had previously held violated title
tive remedies for past breaches); see also supra notes 86-89 and accompanying
text (wetland cases).
251. Other cases have involved racial or gender preferences that were
adopted by consent decree or outside the judicial context altogether. See Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination:Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 78, 81-84 (1986) (discussing voluntary affirmative action plans undertaken by government bodies). In all these contexts, the Court has used the
language of tailoring to evaluate racial or gender preferences. See id. at 83
(noting that Court sets remedies properly tailored to remedy past discrimination). Court-imposed injunctions relate to this Article because judicial power
provides the exclusive basis for the decree.
Affirmative action adopted in the context of a consent decree, according to
the majority in Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.
Ct. 3063, 3072 (1986), should be treated differently from judicially imposed
remedies. That case allowed judges to adopt consent decrees without regard to
the statutory rule if the decrees advance the goals of the statute. Id. at 307778. This is troubling when the consent decree adversely affects third parties
and circumvents the political accountability of defendants to those third
parties.
252. Sullivan, supra note 251, brings together the cases through the end of
the Supreme Court's 1985 term and provides a helpful analysis. The 1986
term's cases include United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053 (1987) and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
253. 106 S. Ct. 3019 (1986). Paradisealso dealt with court-imposed relief.
See 107 S. Ct. at 1064 ("It is now well established that government bodies, including courts, may constitutionally employ racial classifications to remedy unlawful treatment of racial or ethnic groups subject to discrimination.").
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VII.2- 4 Title VII forbids employment decisions based upon race
and other enumerated categories. 255 After the union had repeatedly disobeyed orders to cease further discrimination, the
district court ordered it to bring its minority membership up to
twenty-nine percent.256 As such, the terms of the order overreached the statutory rule because, as all members of the Court
agreed, racial imbalances within a work force do not violate title VII.257
Although they agreed that racial imbalance was not a violation, the Court's members disagreed on the remedy's appropriate scope under the tailoring doctrine for conduct that did
violate the Act. Justice Brennan's plurality voted to affirm the
district court's remedy requiring racial quotas. 258 Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that title VII
expressly prohibited injunctions requiring racial preferences
unless the plaintiffs were actual victims of past discrimina254. Sheet Metal Workers', 106 S. Ct. at 3026 (discussing EEOC v. Local
638, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 401 F. Supp. 467, 487-88 (S.D.N.Y.

1975)).
255. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides:
(a) Employers. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
256. Sheet Metal Workers', 106 S. Ct. at 1027 (noting that nonwhite membership goal was "based on the percentage of nonwhites in the relevant labor
pool in New York City") (citing Local 638, 401 F. Supp. at 488). The Reagan
administration argued that relief other than an order to cease further violations should be available only to the direct victims of the defendants' discrimination. See N.Y. Times, July 3, 1986, at B9, col. 1. According to the Solicitor
General, "'race-conscious remedies which are not victim-specific are never
permissible."' Id. (quoting Charles Fried).
257. Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Justice Brennan found that
the rule of liability
stated expressly that the statute did not require an employer or labor
union to adopt quotas or preferences simply because of a racial imbalance. However, while Congress strongly opposed the use of quotas or
preferences merely to maintain racial balance, it gave no intimation as
to whether such measures would be acceptable as remedies for Title
VII violations.
106 S. Ct. at 3043-44 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
258. See id. at 3054.
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tion.259 Rejecting Justice Rehnquist's reading of title VII, Justice Brennan suggested that judges should assume statutes do
not limit their traditional equitable discretion to tailor remedies
unless the statute expressly states otherwise. 260 Justices White
and O'Connor, writing separate opinions, found the remedy
261
overbroad.
This splintering, however, was not over the applicability of
the tailoring doctrine. 262 Indeed, Justice Brennan stated that a
court must "take care to tailor its orders to fit the nature of the
violation it seeks to correct." 263 Beyond invoking the doctrine
259. Id. at 3063. In other words Justice Rehnquist based his position on a
statutory limit on relief rather than any generally applicable equitable principle such as the tailoring doctrine. Justice Rehnquist cited § 706(g) of title VII
as the limiting provision. Id. Because few statutes speak to the scope of relief
other than through the implications of their rules of liability, Justice Rehnquist's opinion is of little relevance to this Article. Although Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger did not reach the tailoring doctrine in the case,
their views probably coincide with those of Justices O'Connor, see id. at 305762 (concurring in part and dissenting in part), and White, see id. at 3062-63
(dissenting).
260. Id. at 3044. Justice Brennan commented: "In the absence of any indication that Congress intended to limit a district court's remedial authority in a
way which would frustrate the court's ability to enforce Title VH's mandate,
we decline to fashion such a limitation ourselves." Id. Justice Powell, who
supplied the fifth vote for affirmance, echoed Justice Brennan on this point.
See id. at 3054 (concurring) (agreeing that title VII "does not limit a court in
all cases to granting relief only to actual victims of discrimination"). Their position parallels the statement in Hecht Co. v. Bowles that statutes will not be
read to take away courts' power to balance the equities without a clear statement. See 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944); supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
261. See 106 S. Ct. at 3062-63 (White, J., dissenting), 3057-62 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White agreed with the plurality that § 706(g) did not rule out race-conscious remedies that benefit
nonvictims. See id. at 3062 (noting that § 706(g) "does not bar relief for
nonvictims in all circumstances").
Justice O'Connor stated that Justice Brennan's reading of the statute is
contrary to Firefighters Local Union 1784 v. Scotts, 467 U.S. 561 (1984), but she
made little more of that point. See 106 S. Ct. at 3057 (stating that § 706(g) discussion in Scotts was important to its holding, though technically dicta).
Rather, she concentrated on what kind of remedy would be appropriate if the
statute did not rule out race-conscious relief. See id. at 3060 (finding that permissible goal should require "only a good faith effort" by employer or union to
come within range of racial hiring or membership goal).
262. Rather the division came over whether title VII inhibits the courts'
traditional powers to tailor remedies and whether the district's court's remedy
imposed a rigid or a flexible quota. See, e.g., id. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting)
("[C]ontrary to the Court's views, the cumulative effect of the revised affirmative action plan and the contempt judgments against the union established not
just a minority membership goal but also a strict racial quota that the union
was required to attain.").
263. Id. at 3050. Justice O'Connor expressed similar sentiments, see id. at

1988]

INJUNCTIONS

in general terms, however, the Justices said nothing about their
understanding of the doctrine or how it guides judges in formulating injunctive relief. As with the balancing doctrine, the
Court failed to articulate transsubstantive principles to guide
its exercise of equitable discretion. Nonetheless, the positions
taken by the Court's members regarding the injunction's appropriate scope under the tailoring doctrine, although varied, do
evidence substantial implicit agreement as to what the tailoring
doctrine means.
The Justices initially rejected two possible meanings of the
tailoring doctrine.2 6 First, they rejected the notion that the
Court should tailor the remedy to the goal of the statute rather
than its rule of liability. Because title VII seeks to achieve a racially balanced work force through a rule forbidding racial discrimination, a violation of that rule could trigger an order to
achieve racial balance. Justice Brennan rejected such an approach, stating that "the Court should exercise its discretion
with an eye towards Congress's concern that race-conscious affirmative measures not be invoked simply to create a racially
'26 5
balanced work force.
Invoking general principles of equitable discretion and ar2 66
guing that the Court must tailor the remedy to the violation,
Justice Brennan suggested that the remedy must aim to
achieve the rightful position under the statutory rule even if
that falls short of fully vindicating the statutory goal.26 7 This

result clearly comports with the proposed principle, which requires that injunctions honor not only the statutory goals, but
also congressional choices about how to achieve those goalsstatutory rules. Title VII's statutory rule prohibits discrimina3061 (quoting Justice Brennan), as did Justide Powell, see id. at 3055 (remedy
must be narrowly tailored).
264. The Justices also rejected a third argument that under the tailoring
doctrine the Court should limit relief to a reparative order in favor of actual
victims and a preventive order that was not race-conscious. See id. at 3034-52.
265. Id. at 3050. Justice O'Connor chided Justice Brennan for cutting "the
congressional rejection [of race-conscious remedies, which she finds that the
statute itself expressly imposes] loose from any statutory moorings and
mak[ing] this policy simply another factor that should inform the remedial discretion of district courts." Id. at 3059. In other words Justice O'Connor
claimed that only statutory provisions limiting the Court's remedial power
could justify Justice Brennan's rejection of racial balance as a proper injunctive goal--an argument Justice Brennan rejected, see id. at 3050. Justice
O'Connor is wrong, but her error is understandable given the plurality's failure to flesh out its understanding of tailoring.
266. Id. at 3050.
267. See supra text accompanying note 265.
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tion.268 It does not require racial balance. Thus, an order requiring an employer to achieve a racial balance, although it
may vindicate title VII's goals, would ignore Congress's chosen
means-its rule against discrimination.
Second, the Justices unanimously rejected the union's argument that tailoring requires the Court to limit the relief to

actual victims. 269 Such an approach would have allowed the

Court to give actual victims jobs, back pay, and seniority-all
reparative relief. It would have also permitted an order barring
repeat discrimination against past victims-preventive relief.
That approach, however, would have barred preventive relief
for nonvictims such as an order not to discriminate against
them. Under the proposed approach, the Court properly rejected this application of tailoring. Preventive relief for nonvictiros aims to do no more than give the benefit of the rule of
liability to those it protects, it serves the statutory goals, and it
is difficult to imagine any factors that could excuse defendant's
engaging in future violations against fresh victims.
Instead, seven Justices adopted a third approach to the application of tailoring under the facts of Sheet Metal Workers'
that endorsed race-conscious preventive orders in at least some
circumstances.2 7 0 Justice Brennan sanctioned such orders
when employers or unions repeatedly refused to comply with
title VII, thus presenting a threat of continued resistance:
Where an employer or union has engaged in particularly longstanding
or egregious discrimination, an injunction simply reiterating Title
VII's prohibition against discrimination will often prove useless and
will only result in endless enforcement litigation. In such cases, requiring recalcitrant employers or unions to hire and to admit qualified
minorities roughly in proportion to the number of qualified minorities
in the work force may be the only effective way to ensure the full enjoyment of the rights protected by Title VII. 271

According to Justice Brennan, ordering the defendant to do
268. See supra note 255.
269. See 106 S. Ct. at 3047-48. Justices Powell, White, and O'Connor did
not raise any objection to an order to cease violations that benefited nonvictims. That was not a difficult decision because such relief is not race-conscious
and it does no more than tell the defendant to obey the legislated rule of
liability.
270. See id. at 3036 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens); id. at 3054, 3056 (Powell, J., concurring in
part); id. at 3060-62 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 1062 (White, J., dissenting).
271. Id. at 3036. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment on this theory
and Justices White and O'Connor seemed to agree with this theory as a standard of equitable discretion. See supra note 270.
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more than cease its violations-to achieve a particular level of
minority representation in its work force-was necessary to
achieve the plaintiff's rightful position.
Although the injunction's goal was to achieve the rightful
position, its terms, if viewed as solely preventive in purpose,
overreached that position. To be consistent with the proposed
principle, this deviation must have served the statute's goals
and the case must have presented a factor not considered by
the legislature in formulating the statutory rule. Whether
terms deviating from the plaintiff's rightful position served title VII's goals presents a difficult question. The various Justices disagreed over the nature of the deviation-whether the
district court's remedy was flexible or mandatory-and over
what goals the statute served.2 2 On the one hand, Justices
O'Connor and White apparently concluded that title VII sought
to protect nonminorities from the adverse impact of racial preferences and interpreted the district court's remedy as imposing
a rigid quota.2 3 On the other hand, Justices Brennan and Powell concluded that the district court had not imposed a rigid
quota 74 but did not decide whether Congress intended title VII
27 5
to protect nonminorities from reverse discrimination
If Congress did intend the Act to protect nonminority job
applicants from reverse discrimination, requiring a rigid quota
for minority hiring would in fact undercut that goal if the quota
exceeded minority representation among qualified applicants.
In that situation, fulfilling a rigid quota would require hiring
less qualified minority candidates over more qualified nonminority candidates.2 76 Interpreting the remedy imposed as requiring flexible hiring goals rather than a rigid quota, however,
272. See supra note 262.

273. Sheet Metal Workers' 106 S. Ct. at 3059 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); i. at 3062-63 (White, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 3051 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); id. at 3057 n.4 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part). Justice Powell finds rigid quotas objectionable on equal
protection grounds. Id. at 3055-57.
275. This oversight is unfortunate because resolution of that issue would
let lower courts know what sort of quotas they may impose. The importance
of this point would have been made manifest if Justice Brennan had explained
what he meant by tailoring the remedy.
276. Both Justices O'Connor and White made this point. See id. at 3060
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that rigid

quota harms nonminority candidates); id. at 3062 (White, J., dissenting)
(same). Justice O'Connor also suggested that the minority representation requirement goes to overall union membership rather than new union membership so that, absent a large turnover in membership, even a nondiscriminatory
membership policy would not produce compliance with the quota. Id. at 3061.
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would avoid the reverse discrimination problem and reconcile
the injunction with the statutory goal of protecting minority
and nonminority job applicants. Under this analysis, allowing
the injunction's terms to overreach the plaintiff's rightful position served title VII's goals.
Additionally, the case presented a factor that justified
terms going beyond the plaintiff's rightful position. The harm
caused by the defendant's continued resistance created a circumstance not reflected in the rule of liability. Recognizing
this factor, seven Justices implicitly agreed that proper application of the tailoring doctrine supported a reparative order for
actual victims and a preventive order for nonvictims that included flexible, race-conscious goals to overcome the defendant's resistance 277-a result justified under the proposed
principle.
Justice Brennan, however, favored allowing race-conscious
remedies for an additional reason. He held that race-conscious
relief would be appropriate not only when the defendant
presented a threat of continued resistance, but also when "necessary to dissipate the lingering effects of pervasive discrimination." 278
Dissipating discrimination's lingering effects,
according to Brennan, includes overcoming the defendant's reputation for discrimination, which likely discourages applicants
long after the defendant ceases its discrimination. 279 Justice

Brennan also noted that because employers often base hiring
decisions on social connections between present employees and
job applicants, past discrimination could have lingering effects
on the patterns of future hiring.280 Race-conscious relief to address these lingering effects would be preventive because it
would seek to ensure that the defendant provides equal employment opportunity for future job applicants.
Justice Brennan further indicated that race-conscious relief
granted to remedy the lingering effects of discrimination also
277. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
278. Sheet Metal Workers', 106 S. Ct. at 3034. Because the phrases "lingering effects" and "pervasive discrimination" are repeated in tandem later in
Justice Brennan's opinion, see id. at 3050, he undoubtedly intended them to
have distinct meanings.
279. Id. at 3036. Justice Brennan may indeed be defining dissipation of the
"lingering effects of pervasive discrimination," id. at 3034, 3050, when he says:
"[E]ven where the employer or union formally ceases to engage in discrimination, informal mechanisms may obstruct equal employment opportunities. An
employer's reputation for discrimination may discourage minorities from seeking available employment." Id. at 3036 (citations omitted).
280. Id. at 3051.
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might require reparative measures. 281 He did not in fact explicitly limit the concept of dissipating the lingering effects of discrimination to the situations noted above. That concept could
also include, for example, bringing minority representation in a
defendant's work force up to the level that it would have been
at but for the past discrimination-a reparative measure. Interestingly, the order upheld by Justice Brennan in Sheet Metal
Workers' called for a given level of minority representation in
the union's total membership rather than in its new membership from the date of the decree. 28 2 As such, the order seemed
race conscious for distinctly reparative reasons. As Justice
Brennan indicated, the quota upheld had a reparative as well as
a preventive purpose: "[t]he purpose of affirmative action is not
to make identified victims whole, but rather to dismantle prior
patterns of employment discrimination and to prevent discrimi3
nation in the future."28
Justice Brennan failed to show adequately that such reparative relief is consistent with any articulated version of the tailoring doctrine. Bringing minority representation in the
defendant's work force up to the level it would have been at
but for unlawful discrimination differs conceptually from requiring racial balance-a requirement the Court held the injunction could not impose.284 The defendant may have lawfully
excluded minorities before the law was passed, thereby reducing minority representation. Moreover, minority representation in the work force of an employer that had never
discriminated may differ from minority representation in the
relevant labor market because minorities may differ from
others in job preferences and other ways.
Bringing minority representation in the defendant's work
force up to the level that it would have been at but for unlawful discrimination also differs from providing reparative relief
for past victims because some victims, if not most, will have lost
interest in working for the defendant in the interim. In other
words, reparative relief for actual victims plus preventive relief
281. See id. at 3049.
282. See id. at 3027 (describing district court's order). The injunction upheld in United States v. Paradiseconsisted of the same order. See 107 S. Ct.
1053, 1071 (1987); infra note 286.

283. Id. at 3049 (emphasis added). Justice Brennan may have been dropping hints for some future court regarding the use of quotas for reparative
purposes while writing nothing sufficiently explicit to risk losing Justice Powell's vote in the case at hand.
284. See supra notes 265-67 and accompanying text.
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is unlikely to achieve the level of minority representation that
there would have been but for the violation. Consequently, increasing minority representation to the level it would have
reached absent the violation would require the defendant to
give nonvictim minorities a race-conscious preference over
nonminorities.
Would such relief satisfy the proposed principle's requirement that the injunction may not aim to achieve more than the
plaintiff's rightful position? If Congress sought to benefit not
just individual victims of discrimination but also minority
groups as a whole, a quota designed to bring the class up to the
level it would have been at but for the violation would not accomplish more than the plaintiff's rightful position. If Congress meant to benefit individuals rather than groups, however,
a quota to increase minority representation would go beyond
the rightful position because it makes the defendant do more
than the statutory rule requires.
Thus, the proposed principle requires a court to ask what
interests the rule of liability was intended to protect. The Justices in Sheet Metal Workers'. however, failed to ask this question. Without even a glance at legislative intent, Justice
Brennan simply asserted that providing relief "to the class as a
whole rather than to individual members" was appropriate.
Other Justices give no clue as to their view of what Congress
intended title VII to protect. The Court's failure to articulate
its understanding of the tailoring doctrine resulted in its failure
to address a pivotal question of interpretation-what interests
Congress intended the law of liability to protect.
The analysis of Sheet Metal Workers' reveals several important points about the principle proposed to guide application
of the tailoring doctrine. First, seven Justices took positions
consistent with that approach, and none took a necessarily inconsistent position. Second, the seven Justices' failure to articulate what they meant by tailoring resulted in a failure to
address key issues of statutory interpretation. Third, the lack of
articulation results in insufficient guidance for lower courts deciding future title VII cases and, more generally, a continuing
failure to develop transsubstantive principles to guide judges in
fashioning injunctive relief. 286
285. Sheet Metal Workers', 106 S. Ct. at 3049.
286. These failures are perpetuated in the Court's 1987 decision in Paradise. See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1073 (1987). In Paradise
the injunction aimed to achieve 25% minority representation, but Justice
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D. WHICH APPROACH BEST FITs THE JUDIcIAL ROLE?
The judge's need to justify the use of official power requires a definition of the circumstances in which a plaintiff receives less than the rightful position. A judge's need for
justification also suggests that the injunction should not aim to
make the defendant achieve more than that position because
the violation legitimizes the injunction's intrusion on the private defendant's liberty or the governmental defendant's
power. The violation, therefore, should act as a limit on the
scope of the injunction's intrusion.
The proposed principle offers such a definition. That definition, however, does not inevitably yield a clearly right answer. Because Justices debate what tailoring means in
individual cases, such as Sheet Metal Workers', lower court
judges can, in some cases, exploit this uncertainty to advance
private policy objectives. Nonetheless, when scholars criticize
the judiciary for decrees that interfere with private liberty or
the power of the separate political branches, courts have successfully defended, arguing that the need to stop violations of
the law justifies such intrusions.287 A brief examination of the
case law has suggested that courts do generally act consistently
with this defense by tailoring their remedy to the violation,
which brings their actions in accord with the proposed
288
principle.
Professors Chayes and Fiss, however, have a grander vision
of the judge's role in society than the role the tailoring doctrine, as defined by the proposed principle, permits. 28 9 Fiss, for
example, makes this view explicit in objecting that, if the tailoring doctrine limited courts' equitable discretion, judges could
no longer "give meaning to our public values ' 290 in the tradiBrennan, writing the plurality opinion upholding the remedy, offered no justi-

fication for that goal. See id. at 1071-72. The injunction also required the defendant to hire minorities on a one-for-one basis until the 25% goal was
reached. Id. at 1071. Justice O'Connor's dissent pointed out important inconsistencies in Justice Brennan's rationale for this one-for-one quota, see id. at
1080-81, which suggests that Justice Brennan may again be creating pretexts

for racial balancing. See supra notes 282-83 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 230, at 636-37 (arguing that trial court
discretion is inevitably political but still legitimate because it is invoked to
remedy injustices of other branches).
288. See supra notes 172-201 and accompanying text.

289. Chayes's view is implicit in his classic article, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation. See Chayes, supra note 50 passim; Fiss, supra note 22
passim.
290. Fiss, supra note 22, at 52.
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tion of Brown 11.291 Fiss correctly notes that courts do play an
important role in the development of public values.292 He also
makes an important contribution in emphasizing that the declaration of rights in the process of finding liability has far different consequences for public values than the implementation of
a remedy.293 After all, talking about something is different
from going through it.
Fiss and Chayes, however, assert that in their vision of the
development of public values in the course of litigation, the
standard of conduct required by an injunction becomes the
294
norm under which courts judge the conduct of all persons.
Today's injunction becomes tomorrow's generally applicable
rule of liability. This idea conflicts with the tailoring doctrine.
A decree may command an employer to strive for a particular
minority employment goal, but that does not make racial balance the new rule of liability. Because tailoring acts to limit
the judge's role as unconstrained policy maker, Fiss views tailoring as a problem-it interferes with his vision of the courts'
role in developing public values, which is to impose the values
and command compliance with them.
Contrary to Fiss's and Chayes's view, judges help to change
public values not by imposing them, but by teaching the people-that is, by education rather than inculcation. 295 For example, according to Professor Alexander Bickel's account of the
291. 349 U.s. 294 (1955); see supra notes 172-78 and accompanying text.
292. Fiss, supra note 22, at 2.
293. Id. at 52.
294. Chayes, supra note 50, at 46-47; Fiss, supra note 22, at 52; see also
Note, Complex Enforcement: UnconstitutionalPrisonConditions,94 HARV. L.
REv. 626, 637-46 (1981) (arguing that traditionally judges create normative criteria from complex remedies).
295. See, e.g., Chang, Conflic; Coherence, and Constitutional Intent, 72
IOWA L. REV. 753, 878-85 (1987). Consider, for example, the civil rights experi-

ence that Fiss invokes:
What are the sources of fundamental change in our society? From
what spring will justice roll down like water? That mighty stream of
righteousness-how do we find it? Martin Luther King, Jr., ... located that spring inside people: in their hearts, or souls, or whatever
the organ is called that can override selfish calculation and act instead
on love. His strategy called for conversion-if not of the policeman
brandishing the club, then at least of the bystanders watching on
TV.... Far more than he wanted the Voting Rights Act, far more
than he wanted the freedom to eat at dimestore lunch counters, far
more than he wanted black elected officials, King wanted the change
of heart in individual Americans which would make those political developments possible.
Talk of the Town, Notes and Comments, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 1983, at 37 (on
celebration of 20th anniversary of 1963 March on Washington).
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battle over school desegregation, the Court's ruling did not
make public values, but it did make the public feel the trespass
of discrimination. 296 As a result it set the stage for people to
adopt new values about the relationship between the races.
Bickel shows how the Court's initial pronouncement in Brown
I triggered Southern opposition, to which Northerners and
Southern moderates reacted apathetically. 297 Emboldened by
this apathy, the Southern opposition took to the streets, rioting
in Little Rock and elsewhere.
Compulsory segregation, like states' rights and like "The Southern
Way of Life," is an abstraction and, to a good many people, a neutral
or sympathetic one. These riots, which were brought instantly, dramatically, and literally home to the American people, showed what it
means concretely. Here were grown men and women furiously confronting their enemy: two, three, a half dozen scrubbed, starched,
scared, and incredibly brave colored children. The moral bankruptcy,
the shame of the thing, was evident. 298

The tailoring doctrine was central to this process. Once liability was established, the tailoring principle resulted in a command to cease violations and a remand to the defendantschool officials-to determine how they would end the segregation. In a broader sense, however, the remand was to the public's conscience. The courts had negated continuance of the
violation, but, consistent with the remand concept, 299 left to
others the affirmative question of how to live a life unblemished by this violation of the law. When the defendants or the
public tried to avoid this struggle by continuing segregation, the
tailoring doctrine resulted in increasingly intrusive decrees
300
designed to make sure that the trespass could not continue.
296. A. BIcKEL, supra note 7, at 244-72 (2d ed. 1986).
297. See id. at 254-66 (discussing reaction to school desegregation cases and
eventual need for executive enforcement).
298. Id at 266-67.
299. See supra text accompanying note 229. In addition, courts emphasize
damages as a form of relief, which of course leaves the defendants free to decide how to act in the future as long as they are willing to pay damages.
300. 0. FISS, suipra note 131, at 35-37. Similarly, in institutional reform
cases in which the institution cannot overcome conditions that violate the Constitution because the state legislature has refused to appropriate the necessary
funds, courts try to avoid using the supremacy clause to make the state provide the money or even deciding whether they could do so. See, e.g., Welsch v.
Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1977) (finding that federal courts
should try to avoid interfering with state budgeting process); Wyatt v.
Anderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1316-19 (5th Cir. 1974) (same). Instead, courts put
before the state legislature the conflict between their desire to incarcerate
prisoners or the mentally ill and the constitutional objection to incarcerating
people in poor conditions. If the government defendant still does not solve the
problem, courts avoid ordering specific conduct, choosing instead to make it in-
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The courts did not force new values on people but rather cast
guilt upon old values and thus set the stage for people to create
their own values. Fiss thus misconceives the role that courts
play in developing public values and therefore errs in categorizing the tailoring doctrine as part of the problem rather than
as part of the solution.
CONCLUSION
Just as judges must act on the basis of articulated principles when they determine liability, they must also do so when
they fashion injunctive relief. Precedents on the measure of injunctive relief in various substantive areas of the law fail to
provide the necessary principles because they show what prior
courts did but do not explain why in transsubstantive terms.
Although the basic doctrines of balancing the equities and tailoring the remedy are transsubstantive, they are confusing because they deal with one question-the measure of injunctive
relief-in different and vague terms. The pure policy-making
approach advocated by Chayes fails to define these doctrines
because it, in essence, denies the need to subject decisions on
the scope of injunctive relief to the restraints of judicial reasoning. Plater's refined policy-making approach denies judges the
power to balance the equities in statutory cases, although
judges should and do exercise such power.
This Article argues that the judicial role requires the restraint lacking in the pure policy-making approach and the
flexibility in statutory cases denied in Plater's approach. The
key task is to define the principle under which equity should
honor the law, which the Article does: The injunction should
require the defendant to achieve the plaintiff's rightful position
unless (a) different relief is consistent with the goals of the violated rule and (b) the case involves a factor justifying departure
from the rule that was not reflected in its formulation, but the
injunction may never aim to achieve more than the plaintiff's
rightful position.
The essence of this principle is that, in exercising their equitable discretion, judges must honor the decisions that the law
has made as to both the ends-the goals of the law of liabilityand the means-the modes designated by the law of liability to
achieve its ends. Equitable discretion should kick in only when
creasingly difficult to continue the trespass, such as by ordering or threatening
to order inmates released.
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the case presents issues as to the means that the law has left
undecided, and even then it should remain controlled by the
law's decisions as to ends. If so, the law truly is honored in the
breach.
The proposed principle may seem so vague as to be unhelpful or so commonsensical as to be obvious, but it is neither.
Although the principle, like most doctrines, fails to grind out
uniquely right answers-that is, its application requires judgment as to which reasonable people could differ-it does pose
the right questions. The principle does, moreover, help to distinguish seemingly conflicting cases. It also should prove helpful in appeals of injunctions. The standard of review is abuse of
discretion,3 0 ' which becomes a pretense for policy making in
appellate litigation unless the appellate judges articulate what
the trial judge's scope of discretion was in fashioning the injunction. Sheet Metal Workers' is a case in point; the Justices's
arguments passed each other like the proverbial ships in the
night.
The principle is also not obvious. Although an examination
of the case law suggests that judges instinctively come out in
ways consistent with the principle, they sometimes do not, as
seen at points scattered throughout this Article. Moreover,
thoughtful scholars, such as Chayes, Fiss, and Plater, come out
with strikingly different formulations. The best evidence, however, is my own experience. After searching the literature and
the case law years ago for a transsubstantive formulation of injunctive relief and coming up empty-handed, I decided that a
clear statement of the measure of the injunction would save
judges and lawyers much groping in the dark.

301. See, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1953)
(noting that trial court has wide discretion to determine whether "some cognizable danger of recurrent violation" of statute exists and to issue injunctions
accordingly).

